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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
It is with pride, relief, and not a little astonishment that
The Modern American offers our first issue published under a
non-white president—Mr. Barack Obama. Mr. Obama’s election
and inauguration represent the renewal of American energy and
the hope of increased diversity and equality in American politics.
As the President stated on the night of his inauguration: “It’s the
answer spoken by young and old, rich and poor, Democrat and
Republican, black, white, Latino, Asian, Native American, gay,
straight, disabled and not disabled—Americans who sent a message to the world that we have never been a collection of Red
States and Blue States: we are, and always will be, the United
States of America.”
Mr. Obama’s election, however, does not represent the
end of racism or the end of discrimination in America. It is a
milestone, but only one along the road to equality. The American
people should and will continue to question the status quo of
American law and politics, and The Modern American hopes to
be a strong voice in that dialog.

cross-cultural relations in our community. We are also proud to
announce that our readership base continues to expand; subscribers will now be able to access The Modern American through
V.lex, LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and the Westlaw database. In the
spirit of environmentalism, we are pleased to continue to offer a
green publication.
The Modern American would like to thank our former
Executive Board and staff members who are graduating in May
2009. We commend them for their contribution to the prevalent
discussion of legal issues affecting minorities in out country, and
their outstanding dedication to our publication. We encourage
them to keep moving forward in their roles as social engineers by
facilitating conversations about diversity and the law, and by challenging existing discrimination through education and action.
In closing, we hope our issue inspires you to continue
fostering the discourse on diversity and embracing everyday
change in your community.
Sincerely yours,

This year has been an interesting one, both for America
and The Modern American. On April 14, 2009, our Fourth Annual
Symposium will gather renowned scholars to address the separation of church and state and the regulation of morality as it affects
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Transitioning Our Prisons Toward Affirmative Law:
Examining the Impact of Gender Classification Policies
on U.S. Transgender Prisoners
By
Richael Faithful*

I. Introduction

Even fewer data are available for transgender prisoners. A 2005
study shows, however, that transgender people are two or three
“I’m raped on a daily basis. I’ve made complaint
times more likely to be incarcerated than the general populaafter complaint, but no response. No success.
tion.12 Many corrections departments’ policies fail to recognize
I’m scared to push forward with my complaints
transgender people despite this disproportionate representation.
against officers for beating me up and raping
Some areas of law enforcement are beginning to recme. I was in full restraint when the correctional
ognize
gender
variant people (non-gender conforming people
officers assaulted me. Then afterwards they said
who
may
include
transgender and intersex people). Even so, law
I assaulted them. All the officers say is ‘I didn’t
enforcement,
particularly
prison systems, are quickly discoverdo it.’ The Inspector General said officers have
ing
that
they
are
unable
to
adequately respond to the increasing
a right to do that to me. That I’m just a man and
number
of
transgender-identified
and intersex people entering
shouldn’t be dressing like this….”1
their doors. Bianca and others are subject to the constant threat
Bianca is a female-identified prisoner currently incarcer- of physical and sexual violence, creating legally inhumane and
ated in the general population of a New York state men’s prison. morally intolerable conditions. The American prison system has
Bianca’s experience is traumatic, shocking, and real. Every day, reached a moral crisis regarding transgender rights that impinges
transgender people like Bianca face painful choices about their on basic constitutional protections13—a crisis which must be
well-being in our society. Transgender people who are in prison tackled with policy and law-making that fundamentally changes
have even fewer choices. Our prison system not only punishes incarceration practices.
This article will trace how sexual
them, but it further sentences them to live
violence
related judicial and legislative hiswithin their own bodies’ betrayal.
tory
has
framed and impacted transgender
Modern ideas about gender have
Our
prison
system
not
only
prisoners’
rights. I will first explain the prefast-outpaced the law. Theorists today
vailing
U.S.
prisoner classification standard
describe gender identity as a complex punishes them, but it further
and
the
policy
incongruence that underreflection of how we see our genotypic,
sentences
them
to
live
within
2
mines
its
intended
purposes and rationales.
physical, and social selves. Gender exprestheir
own
bodies’
betrayal.
Then
I
will
then
discuss the District of
sion is the manifest gender identity usually
Columbia’s
proposed
policy, which promexpressed by “masculine” and “feminine”
3
ises
to
be
a
small
step
forward for prisons
choices from hair length to clothing. Every
in
their
treatment
of
transgender
prisoners.
Finally,
I will share
person possesses a gender identity and expresses this identity;
4
recommendations
for
the
District
of
Columbia
and
other
jurisdicmany social scientists call this phenomenon “doing gender.” An
tions
wishing
to
move
forward
a
positive
transgender
prisoners’
increasing number of scholars and advocates (including lawyers)
argue that “both sex and gender are socially constructed and both rights law.
sex and gender are socially real.” 5
Conventional notions establish a binary gender classification system: male and female. Transgender people may be
II. Sexual Violence Litigation and Legislation
considered a third group: their gender identity or expression does
Create Opening for Transgender Rights
not conform to their assigned birth gender, and they may transition from one gender to another.6 Sexual orientation, defined by
1. Supreme Court Decision Recognizes
the gender of those to whom a person is sexually attracted, is
Federal Liability for Exposing Transgender
a distinct identity from a person’s gender. In fact, “transgender
Prisoners to High-Risk Environments
people have all sexual orientations.” 7
Few statistics are available about the transgender popuTransgender prisoners’ rights are a newly recognized
lation.8 Nonetheless, one international transgender study found area in U.S. jurisprudence. They have been deliberated largely on
that 8% of respondents self-identified as a gender other than the state level, in which state prisons have more or less success“male” or “female.” 9 Among the U.S. population, an estimated fully addressed transgender prisoners’ needs through administra.25% to 1% of the population has undergone at least one sex reas- tive policy-making. Several court cases, however, have intervened
signment surgery.10 Transgender women (male-to-female) are to more firmly establish rights that affect transgender prisoners.
“1.5 to 3 times more prevalent than female-to-male” persons.11 A particular concern involves the safety of trans-women confined
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within male populations, such as their vulnerability to sexual constitutional right.’” 23 By construing a federal statute in this
violence. Lower court decisions have variably affirmed transgen- way, prisoner protections are subject to a wide outcome range
der prisoners’ rights to safer living conditions, but no ruling has rendering inconsistent application for members belonging to vuldefinitively objected to the administrative status quo that allows nerable prison communities. A subjective test or modified objecand even promotes genitalia-based classification.
tive test would have more broadly protected Farmer and other
The only U.S. Supreme Court case to touch this issue transgender prisoners.
is a 1994 case, Farmer v. Brennan. Farmer was a narrow deciFarmer’s counsel made a compelling argument about the
sion holding that a federal official could be liable under the adverse implications of a subjective test. The concern was that
Eighth Amendment by acting with “delibthe absence of an objective test would pererate indifference” to a prisoner’s health or
mit prison officials to ignore danger toward
safety, but only if she or he knew that the
prisoners.24 On first impression, this arguprisoner faced “substantial risk of serious The American prison system ment implies a legal-gaming problem,
harm.”14 The petitioner, Dee Farmer, was
especially given the nature of prison envihas reached a . . . crisis
a trans-woman (male-to-female) who had
ronments whose culture is predicated on
which must be tackled with dominance and control. The more salient
undergone estrogen therapy, two sex reassignment surgeries, and was diagnosed by policy and law-making that danger may be the confusion of issues
the Bureau of Prisons as having gender
due to the pervasiveness of gender myths
fundamentally changes
dysphoria.15 Farmer was placed with the
in our correctional and legal institutions.
incarceration practices.
general male population during a transfer
For example, if a transgender woman is
from a state to a federal prison. Within two
believed to be an effeminate gay man, then
weeks, her cellmate had brutally attacked
the “deliberate indifference” test is not met
and raped her.16 This ruling opened federal officials to a lawsuit because an objective prison official might reasonably (though
only if two things were true: if they had substantial certainty that incorrectly) believe that the transgender prisoner is still malea prisoner was at risk and they failed to prevent or minimize the identified. Objective “reasonable” tests invariably fail new, marrisk.17 Other authors have examined the case’s constitutional ele- ginalized classes of plaintiffs. They are a weak liability indicator
ments in depth,18 so I will only examine its concrete impact on for invisible or marginalized prisoners who are most at risk. A
transgender prisoners.
“deliberate indifference” standard becomes even more difficult
Farmer was a seminal case because it affirmed trans- to reach for transgender prisoners who must prove an official had
gender prisoners’ right to humane confinement conditions under 1) sufficient knowledge about gender identity and gender expresthe Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual sion and 2) an adequate appreciation for how a prisoner’s gender
punishment.” At the same time, Farmer was an extremely limited identity may expose a prisoner to a substantial harm. The likeliholding because of the narrow construction and application of hood of a transgender prisoner proving “deliberate indifference”
the “deliberate indifference” test. The test requires a liable party appears extremely low.
Lower court decisions have inconsistently protected
to have actual subjective knowledge of a risk. This too easily
favors an “ignorance” defense, and sets up a high standard for transgender prisoners from improper classification. In Crosby
v. Reynolds, in 1991, a female prisoner brought a Fifth Amendtransgender prisoners seeking relief.
“Deliberate indifference” lies between negligence and ment privacy violation suit against prison officials for housing
malice. It is sometimes referred to as recklessness “that is more her with a transgender woman.25 The Court stated that “officials
than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or here were confronted with a situation that had no perfect answer”
safety” 20 but is “something less than acts or omissions for the and held that prison officials were entitled to qualified immuvery purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will nity for reassigning the transgender woman into the women’s
result.” 21 Such harm must be substantial or be sufficiently seri- facility.26 Four years later, in Lucrecia v. Samples, a federal court
ous to be considered a deprivation of rights.22 It is unclear from rejected a transgender woman’s numerous constitutional violathe opinion whether wrongly classifying a trans-woman alone tion claims, including one claiming an Eighth Amendment Due
constitutes a sufficiently serious deprivation, and for this reason Process violation based on an exception allowing actions for
is it clear how the test may apply to Farmer and other transgen- “legitimate penological interests.”27 Most recently in 1999, in
der prisoners who may or may not come forward about sexual Powell v. Schriver, an HIV-positive transgender woman sued the
abuse. Although the Court implies that exposure to targeted sex- prison on Fifth and Eighth Amendment grounds when the prison
ual violence may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment staff informed other prisoners of the plaintiff ’s gender identity.
(assuming that the “deliberate indifference” test is met), it will Although the plaintiff ’s jury award for privacy violation set aside
fall to future cases to clarify the test’s application on transgender by the lower court was not reinstated, the plaintiff successfully
prisoners.
had her Eighth Amendment claim remanded upon the court’s
The Farmer Court chose not to alter the objective “delib- finding that no qualified immunity existed for disclosure of her
erate indifference” test even though the fact that Farmer was a gender identity.28 The two latter cases (Lucrecia and Powell),
transgender person should have deserved separate attention. The like Farmer, involved prisoners who experienced sexual violence
Court rejected petitioner’s request to make deliberate indiffer- resulting from misplacement. These cases suggest that there has
ence an objective test, finding that “Section 1983 (which provides been a positive judicial evolution over the years that charts a path
a cause of action) ‘contains no state-of-mind requirement inde- for advocates seeking greater legal recognition and protection for
pendent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying transgender prisoners.
4
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2. Prison Rape Elimination Act (“Prea”) Enacts
National Standards Designed to Better Protect
Prisoners from Sexual Violence

III. Failure to Preserve Transgender Prisoners’
Human Rights Is Rooted in Antiquated
Genitalia-Based Classification Policies

Congress is beginning to recognize transgender prison1. Genitalia Serves as the Prevailing Prisoner
ers’ rights. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 was the first
Gender Classification Standard in U.S. and Fails
piece of federal legislation to address prisoner sexual violence.
to Treat Transgender People Fairly
Among its stated purposes, the Act aimed to “(1) establish a
zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of rape in prisons in the
Generally, U.S. jurisdiction classifies prisoners by their
United States” and “(2) make the prevention of prison rape a top perceived anatomical sex (genitalia): male or female.38 As articupriority in each prison system.” 29 To reach its goals, Congress lated in the Transgender Law Center’s testimony, as long as the
established a bipartisan panel, the National Prison Rape Elimina- inmate possesses internal and external sex organs corresponding
tion Commission (“NPREC”), which was charged with making with a specific sex, he or she will be housed in accordance with
national standard recommendations to the Attorney General.30 that sex.39 Genitalia-based policies represent a rarefied reality of
NPREC held eight public hearings throughout the country where gender-segregated facilities that have no place for gender variant
transgender lawyers and advocates testified about the problems people. Gender segregation itself may not be the most critical
faced by transgender prisoners.31
issue; some argue “just as culpable, and
San Francisco-based Transgender
possibly more so, are the gendered expectaLaw Center (“TLC”) testified in the Califortions that this segregation creates.” 40 Most
. . . this violence does not jurisdictions do not recognize transgender
nia hearing entitled “At-Risk: Sexual Abuse
and Vulnerable Groups Behind Bars.” 32
exist, and cannot be
people within procedural policies—classiTLC shared that in addition to rape and understood, [for transgender fication-based or otherwise—at all.
coercion, sexual violence experienced by
Some state and local jurisdictions,
people] in a vacuum . . .
transgender prisoners may include “unnecincluding California, Illinois, Minnesota,
essary strip searches, and forced nudity, and
New York, Oregon, and Washington, have
harassment.” 33 Most striking was the testiestablished non-discrimination policies,
mony that “this violence does not exist, and cannot be under- hormone treatment guidelines, and staff training requirements
stood, [for transgender people] in a vacuum,” 34 referring to the for transgender prisoners.41 But only one jurisdiction’s youth
widespread transgender discrimination outside prison that leads division, in New York, provides a self-identification classificato over-incarceration.35
tion policy in which transgender prisoners may self-select their
Since PREA’s passage over five years ago there has been placement.42
significant scrutiny over the Act’s efficacy.36 There is little eviMany prisons confront this issue with administrative
dence that PREA has curbed transgender violence. Of PREA’s segregation (solitary confinement) as an alternative to placement
national standard recommendations, those that are most relevant with the general population,43 believing it to be the best availto transgender prisoners have yet to be broadly reflected in admin- able solution.44 In reality, administrative segregation “allows a
istrative policies (discussed later in this article). For example, prisoner minimal interaction with other people, no access to jobs
Recommendation Cl-2 on Classification Assessment provides:
or treatment programs, and greatly restricted privileges . . . . The
stated purpose of administrative segregation is that people being
During the internal classification process,
confined within it are a proven danger to themselves, staff, or
staff assesses every inmate to determine his
other inmates the message is being sent that a person’s gender
or her potential to be sexually abused by other
identity itself is threatening to the institution . . . .” 45 Gender variinmates and his or her potential to be sexually
ance has proved to be threatening to prisons that are balancing
abusive…Every inmate’s classification assesstwo imperatives: preserving order and protecting its prisoners
ment is reviewed and updated, as necessary,
and officials from violence and legal issues associated with vioat regular intervals, following significant incilence. Nonetheless, transgender prisoners should not be punished
dents, and whenever new and relevant informafor a dilemma that prisons have been unable to resolve.
tion is available.37
Legislatures sometimes distinguish between postoperative prisoners and pre-operative prisoners.46 Post-operative
This recommendation does not explicitly enumerate
prisoners, known as transsexuals, are transgender people who
transgender prisoners, but calls for procedures that would better
have had sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”) that changes a perprotect them from abuse by advising case-by-case consideration.
son’s external anatomy from a particular sex to another.47 The
When given the opportunity, PREA and NPREC failed to chalconsequence of differentiating between pre- and post-operative
lenge genitalia-based classification policies. Instead they chose to
transgender prisoners is significant. Post-operative prisoners are
draft flexible individualized policies that stop short of addressing
usually able to be classified according to their gender identity.
transgender prisoners as a class. Although flexible classification
Pre-operative or non-operative prisoners are not. When prisoners
policies are better than the current binary male/female system,
are sorted by post-operative or pre-operative status, they are in
discretionary policies are unlikely to improve conditions for prisreality being sorted by economic class. The umbrella term “sex
oners whose needs remain deeply misunderstood.
reassignment surgery” is misleadingly simplistic because it refers
to a large set of costly medical procedures.48 SRS tends to be
Spring 2009
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prohibitively expensive or otherwise unavailable to most people
for a variety of reasons,49 ensuring that an overwhelming majority of transgender prisoners are housed within high-risk environments, based primarily by their economic means. Another related
problem is the post- and pre-operative distinction is a social and
legal fiction. It makes classification results random, disparate,
unequal, and unfair.

2. Current Policies Fail to Treat Transgender
People Equally
The high level of scrutiny directed toward gender variant people’s bodies is patently unfair and impracticable. During
intake, gender-variant people often undergo a higher level of
scrutiny of their bodies than others when prison and medical staff
try to place them within the binary system.50 Simply envision
this scenario for yourself. It may be difficult to imagine being
classified, housed, and referred to by a gender with which you
do not identify. It may be even harder to conceive being poked,
prodded, and examined by several prison and medical staff to
determine “which one you are.” Such an experience may stretch
beyond imagination, but it may happen if your body is perceived
to be different from other women or men. Truth is our bodies do
not necessarily resemble one sex more than the other. After all,
“Some women have wombs, some do not. Some men have facial
hair, some do not.” 51 At times, our anatomical and sexual characteristics bear greater resemblance across the sexes than within.
For instance, where does a prison place a trans-woman who has
developed breasts but has testes and a penis? Transgender people
who may manifest sexual characteristics from “both” genders
cannot be properly classified because no place currently exists
for them.
A genitalia-based classification system privileges socalled post-operative prisoners over pre-operative and nonoperative prisoners. Existing policies provide drastically different
fates for similarly situated people. Transgender prisoners experience extremely inconsistent treatment based on the whims of the
staff. Likewise, non-discrimination policies designed to produce
policy consistency and accountability are undermined by genitalia classification policies.

3. Non-Discrimination Policies Are Rendered
Ineffective by Classification Policies
The overall prevalence of transgender discrimination,
such as unequal access to programs or extensive verbal abuse,
is unknown. A 2003 survey by the Transgender Law Center and
National Center for Lesbian Rights revealed that, from a 150person sample, 14% of respondents reported experiencing discrimination within prisons.52 Such a high report expresses the
need for prisons’ responsiveness, and is demonstrative of the
prisons’ failure to address bias against transgender prisoners.
Failure to recognize transgender prisoners or their rights is an
example of institutional discrimination by the criminal justice
system. Until the U.S. prison system can systemically recognize
transgender rights, isolated jurisdictional efforts will have a limited impact. Most anomalous, however, is the dual existence of
non-discrimination policies protecting transgender prisoners and
codified discrimination against them within some jurisdictions.53
When jurisdictions adopt trans-inclusive non-discrimination
6

policies and yet maintain genitalia-based classification, neither
policy is effective.
Prisons and associated agencies undermine their own
non-discrimination policy by simultaneously adopting a classification-by-genitalia policy. There are legitimate reasons for each
policy, which serve independent functions. Non-discrimination
policies are part of a larger prison accountability system that
helps protect prisoners from inequity. On the other hand, classification policies are essential for efficient procedural systems.
On their face, these systems appear to have distinctive purposes.
While a non-discrimination policy requires equal treatment
among prisoners, they can also mask the existence of discrimination. If all prisoners are subject to the same procedures, including
classification for housing and other purposes, then it may be reasoned that no discrimination is present. The interaction of nondiscrimination policies and genitalia-based classification policies
in the case of transgender prisoners, however, demonstrates systemic weaknesses.
Systemic weaknesses should be remedied, not ignored.
If the criminal justice system incarcerates large numbers of transgender people, it must accept the necessity of reform to accommodate their needs.54 Well-intentioned efforts to recognize
transgender people are rendered ineffective by antiquated classification policies. To address this moral and practical problem,
the District of Columbia is offering an innovative model.

IV. The District of Columbia Proposes a
Non-Genitalia Based Classification System
1. Transgender People Are the Newest Protected
Class under D.C.’s Non-Discrimination Law
Patti Shaw was involved in a domestic dispute with her
husband on October 26, 2003 in the District of Columbia. During booking at the police station, the officers found court records
indicating a prior arrest under the name Melvin Lee Hammond.
The court system did not have a way to change her name or gender identification without a judge’s order, even though Patti had
a legal name change and sex re-assignment surgery. She was
placed in a male cellblock overnight while awaiting arraignment.
The next morning Patti Shaw reported being sexually assaulted
by one or more male prisoners. The incident prompted D.C. law
enforcement to examine its criminal records system.55
Two years later, the D.C. City Council passed the Human
Rights Clarification Amendment Act of 2005. The amendment
added “gender identity or expression” to its non-discrimination
law, the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977.56 The primary impetus for the amendment came from a desire to clarify lawmakers’
original intent to protect transgender people. Public testimony on
the Act from the Gay and Lesbian Activists Alliance (“GLAA”),
D.C.’s major gay and lesbian rights organization, revealed that
D.C. had historically protected transgender people against discrimination based on “personal appearance.” 57 GLAA and
transgender rights’ advocates argued that lawmakers had always
intended to protect transgender people even though the statute
did not identify “gender identity and expression” as a protected
status.58
Whatever the act’s original intention, transgender D.C.
residents needed its protection. Different Avenues, a non-profit
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for young adults affected by violence, HIV, and discrimination,
reported that 60% of the transgender population surveyed by the
D.C. Administration of HIV and AIDS had a yearly income of
$10,000 or less.” 59 The D.C. Council adopted the addition on
December 6, 2005.60 D.C. residents like Patti Shaw were unambiguously included in the protection of the city’s non-discrimination law.

2. D.C.’s Department of Corrections
Proposed New Policy Establishes Deliberative
Body for Gender Classification
Led by the D.C. Trans-Coalition (“D.C.T.C.”), a transgender political advocacy group, a campaign was launched to
enforce the Human Rights Act within the city’s Department of
Corrections (“D.O.C.”). D.C.T.C., along with other local and
national advocates and lawyers sought to alter D.O.C.’s policy
regarding transgender prisoners, including its classification and
hormone therapy procedures.
On January 5, 2009, the D.O.C. issued a new directive
revising its classification and housing policies within its operations.61 The policies’ purpose is substantially broad as it seeks
to establish procedures appropriate for “transgender, transsexual,
inter-sex, and gender variant persons” incarcerated by the D.O.C.62
Like the previous May 10, 2008 policy, the directive includes
definitions for “gender expression,” “inter-sex,” “sexual orientation,” “transsexual,” and “gender variant”; a non-discrimination
statement, and initial intake procedures for gender determination.
Gender determination has been a routine procedure for all prisoners, but the directive made it more detailed for gender-variant
inmates. If staff believes that there is a discrepancy between a
prisoner’s gender and genitalia after a physical examination, then
the policy calls for more extensive protocol including a genitalia
examination by medical staff.63
Two significant changes appeared in the new policy.
First, transgender prisoners who wish to begin hormone therapy
are permitted to do so with medical authorization. Although
some other jurisdictions currently permit hormone therapy continuation, very few permit new therapy to begin while in prison.
This change is a significant step forward for prisoners’ mental and physical well-being (for those who can afford it). More
important, however, is the second revision creating a Transgender Committee. The Transgender Committee is an appointed
D.O.C. body comprised of a “medical practitioner, mental health
clinician, a correctional supervisor, a case manager, and D.O.C.
approved volunteer knowledgeable about transgender issues.” 64
It is charged to determine prisoner classification after reviewing a prisoner’s records, conducting a prisoner interview, and
evaluating a prisoner’s vulnerability to abuse within the general
prison population. After an initial intake, a prisoner will remain
in protective custody (consistent with the prisoner’s genitalia) up
to 72 hours until classification is determined by the Transgender Committee.65 These revisions reflect a sea change that corresponds with increased transgender visibility, advocacy, and
understanding.
No other U.S. prison policy provides for a collaborative body for gender classification, and no other peer nation66
has an equivalent prison policy. Most similar to this model is the
United Kingdom’s legal sex change panel process established by
the Gender Recognition Act of 2004.67 Any person over 18 who
Spring 2009

wishes to legally change his or her sex must apply to a regional
committee that considers “evidence” from medical professionals confirming that person’s gender dysphoria.68 An approved
application issues a gender recognition certificate that changes a
person’s legal documentation to reflect his or her “acquired” gender.69 There is no comparable federal process within the United
States, where birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other legal
documents may be changed depending on each state’s law. The
District of Columbia has adopted the most progressive transgender prisoner classification in the country to date.

V. Moving Toward a Positive Transgender
Prisoner Rights Law
1. Enhancing D.C.’s Most Recent
Policy Proposal
Representatives from D.C.T.C., the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and Just
Detention International submitted several recommendations to
D.O.C. about how to improve the new proposed policy previously
discussed in the last section.70 Concerns evident in these recommendations stress the need for more accountability, particularly
as community advocates fear that the Transgender Committee
will become a mere formality by declining to take an active role
in re-classifying prisoners.
Three recommendations reflect this concern. First,
although the Transgender Committee would conduct important work, “further clarification [i]s needed to specify how the
Committee will make and document its decisions.” 71 Aware that
D.O.C. has adopted the most transgender-friendly policy in the
country, this recommendation identifies Committee transparency
as a key component for gauging its progress. Second, the policy
should “explicitly state that the Transgender Committee’s recommendation can be appealed.” 72 Any deliberative body without an
appeals process lies contrary to current national standards, such
as PREA, that recommend periodic review for vulnerable prisoners.73 An appeals process will ensure that transgender prisoners will have more opportunity to protect their rights, especially
when a genitalia policy remains the default classification policy.
Finally, “in some cases, placing a transgender inmate in collective protective custody with other transgender inmates may be
the least restrictive option for maintaining the inmate’s safety,
and therefore should be included as a possibility.” 74 This recommendation underlines administrative segregation problems and
offers an alternative: a transgender housing unit. “Collective protective custody” is perhaps the fairest option compared to general population or segregation, but it runs the risk of prisoner
ghettoization.
Flexible self-identification remains the ideal classification policy. Several non-U.S. jurisdictions have adopted some
form of this policy. New South Wales, Australia, for example,
presumes that “inmates have a right to be placed in the facility
of their ‘gender identification’ unless it is determined, on a caseby-case basis, that they should be placed elsewhere.” 75 Within
this system, default classification falls on gender identity, not
genitalia. Flexibility is essential for the same reasons discussed
in previous sections about the complex relationships among gender identity, expression, and body diversity. A trans-man, for
7

instance, may be extremely vulnerable in a male population, even
though he is male-identified. Most importantly, self-identification
policies do not only best serve gender variant prisoners, but are a
reasonable management option.76

2. Targeting Transgender Criminalization
Self-identification prison policies affirm prisoners’ basic
human dignity and preserve their rights under the U.S. Constitution. However, such policies alone will not fully address the issue.
Transgender over-incarceration remains the heart of the problem.
The criminal justice system cannot understand the increase of
this community within prisons walls if it does not examine the
reasons underpinning the trend.
Transgender criminalization is part of an insidious
continuum of societal discrimination against gender nonconformity. The U.S. imprisoned population has grown 390% in 24
years.77 People of color and poor people have been disproportionately affected by this increase, and “transgender and gender
non-conforming people are disproportionately poor, homeless,
criminalized, and imprisoned.” 78 Entrenched job discrimination,
low income levels, and exposure to other risk factors essentially
create a prison pipeline. Many transgender people are forced to
commit “survival crimes” such as sex work and healthcare supply
theft due to narrowed economic access and opportunity; and evidence of police trans-profiling further compounds imprisonment
rates.79 Opposing workplace discrimination, cracking down on

profiling, and providing community-based, gender-appropriate
alternatives to imprisonment are all proactive, systemic legal
approaches to transgender over-incarceration recommended by
the Slyvia Rivera Project. These suggestions show that the criminal justice system alone cannot combat transgender de-humanization; legislatures and cultural leaders must also contribute to a
positive social climate for gender variant people.

VI. Conclusion
Moving toward a more affirmative transgender rights
jurisprudence is an emerging challenge facing the U.S. prison
system. Legal advocates have shown that our current system
is not sustainable; functionality or the means by which prisons
can prevent physical and sexual violence will be limited if lawmakers are too slow to respond. Even more important, however,
is the tragedy that transgender prisoners collectively suffer from
discrimination in our society and are perhaps the least among us.
Although many Americans may not know that transgender people
exist, they do know and likewise react to gender non-conformity.
Transgender rights are an indicator by which we can gauge our
moral and legal advancement. Our institutional failures implicate
our legal system’s humane treatment standards. Attention and
effort toward improvement, nonetheless, brings us ever closer to
moral restoration.
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Ain’t No Peace Until We Get A Piece: Exploring the
Justiciability and Potential Mechanisms of Reparations
for American Blacks Through United States Law,
Specific Modes of International Law, and the
Covenant for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (“CERD”)
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Dekera Greene*

I. The Prologue 1
In the beginning was the word
And the word was Death
And the word was nigger
And the word was death to all niggers
And the word was death to all life
And the word was death to all
peace be still . . .
In the name of peace
They waged the wars
ain’t they got no shame
In the name of peace
Lot’s wife is now a product of the Morton company
nah they ain’t got no shame . . .
Cause they killed the Carthaginians
in the great appian way
And they killed the Moors
“to civilize a nation”
And they just killed the earth
And blew out the sun in the name of a god
Whose genesis was white
And war wooed god
And america was born
Where war became peace
And genocide patriotism
And honor is a happy slave
cause all god’s chillun need rhythm
And glory hallelujah why can’t peace
be still
The great emancipator was a bigot
ain’t they got no shame
And making the world safe for democracy
Were twenty million slaves
nah they ain’t got no shame . . .
The rumblings of this peace must be stilled
be stilled be still
ahh Black people
ain’t we got no pride?2
10

***
As Germany and other interests that profited owed
reparations to Jews following the holocaust of Nazi
persecution, America and other interests that profited
owe reparations to blacks following the holocaust of
African slavery which has carried forward from slavery’s inception for 350-odd years to the end of U.S.
government-embraced racial discrimination.3
***
The civil-rights struggle involves the black man
taking his case to the white man’s court. But when
he fights it at the human-rights level, it is a different situation. It opens the door to take Uncle Sam to
the world court. The black man doesn’t have to go to
court to be free. Uncle Sam should be taken to court
and made to tell why the black man is not free in a socalled free society. Uncle Sam should be taken to the
United Nations and charged with violating the UN
charter of human rights. You can forget civil rights.
. . . It is absolutely impossible to do it in Uncle Sam’s
courts—whether it is the Supreme Court or any other
kind of court that comes under Uncle Sam’s jurisdiction. The only alternative that the black man has in
America today is to take it out of Senator Dirksen’s
and Senator Eastland’s and President Johnson’s jurisdiction and take it downtown on the East River and
place it before that body of men who represent international law, and let them know that the human rights
of black people are being violated in a country that
professes to be the moral leader of the free world.4
***
The imagination of the academic philosopher cannot recreate the experience of life on the bottom . . .
The technique of imagining oneself black and poor in
some hypothetical world is less effective than studying the actual experience of black poverty and listening to those who have done so. When notions of
right and wrong, justice and injustice, are examined
not from an abstract position but from the position of
groups who have suffered through history, moral relativism recedes and identifiable normative priorities
emerge . . . reparations is a legal concept generated
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from the bottom. It arises not out of abstraction, but
from experience.5
***
I am an invisible man . . . I am invisible, understand,
simply because people refuse to see me . . . When
they approach me they see only my surroundings,
themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.6

II. Introduction
Kugichagulia – Self-determination: To define ourselves, name
ourselves, create for ourselves and speak for ourselves.7
The oppression of people of color,8 particularly Black
and the economic growth of America has historically
been in direct proportion. The success, then, of American capitalism and imperialism has rested in the marginalization of Black
people through chattel slavery, de jure and de facto segregation,
and racial discrimination.10 These institutional and structural
hindrances11 result in several challenges, including: low rates of
home, land, and resource ownership; overrepresentation in jails
and prisons; underrepresentation in areas of educational attainment; significantly larger proportions of unemployed and underemployed persons and low rates of business ownership; the lack
of access to healthcare and high rates of disease contraction12; and
single parenthood, orphanage, and the destruction and disconnection of the Black family. The perpetuation of such marginalizing
and interweaving systems wrought ills on a people, ultimately
dispossessing and disenfranchising the whole. Reparations, then,
while owed as repair for previous harms and their resulting ills,
are key to remedying the current condition and instrumental in
closing the gap of disparity.13 While damages cannot account for
all losses, and it is impossible to restore the aggrieved wholly, it
is backwards to maintain a structure that profits the beneficiaries of a maliciously designed system, while simultaneously discounting the real harms of the injured parties—American Blacks.
Those who disagree engage in the malicious cycle that continues
to marginalize Black people.
This indignation demonstrates ignorance of history,
economics, and sociology, and manifests the damage of American imperialism and the perversion of its design. Even the language that typifies this dynamic is inverted to further confuse
and detract from this perpetually marginalizing structure. Such
behavior maintains a system where the ugly become beautiful,
the oppressed become the oppressors, and the powerful become
the powerless. As rapper Nas describes it: “Anytime we mention our history, existence or condition, they calling it reverse
racism.”14 Brother Malcolm15 contended the same:
people,9

So I don’t believe in violence—that’s why I
want to stop it. And you can’t stop it with love,
not love of those things down there. No! So,
we only mean vigorous action in self-defense,
and that vigorous action we feel we’re justified
in initiating by any means necessary. Now, for
saying something like that, the press calls us
racist and people who are “violent in reverse.”
Spring 2009

Kara Walker, Camptown Ladies, May 1, 2006.
This is where they psycho you. They make you
think that if you try to stop the Klan from lynching you, you’re practicing violence in reverse.
Pick up on this, I hear a lot of you parrot what
the man says. You say, “I don’t want to be a
Ku Klux Klan in reverse.” Well, if a criminal
comes around your house with his gun, brother,
just because he’s got a gun and he’s robbing
your house, and he’s a robber, it doesn’t make
you a robber because you grab your gun and
run him out. No, the man is using some tricky
logic on you. I say it is time for black people to
put together the type of action, the unity, that is
necessary to pull the sheet off of them so they
won’t be frightening black people any longer.
That’s all. And when we say this, the press calls
us “racist in reverse.” “Don’t struggle except
within the ground rules that the people you’re
struggling against have laid down.” Why this is
insane, but it shows how they can do it. With
skillful manipulating of the press they’re able
to make the victim look like the criminal and
the criminal look like the victim.16
Rapper and activist Immortal Technique simply encapsulates the idea of deconstructing the language and systems of
the oppressor through revolutionary empowerment—a sentiment
present in the philosophies articulated above: “My revolution is
borne out of love for my people, not hatred for others.”17 It is
understandable that a pervasive backward sentiment continues to
inform and foment a malicious infrastructure in both law and
society, unfortunately to the detriment of an already historicallymaligned people. This paper, then, explores the usage of international law and American law under the auspices of international
law to access reparations and facilitate the carving out of selfdetermination for Black people. This presents a unique irony
where the law is applied as an inversion of its design since it has
historically protected others’ rights while marginalizing Black
people.
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III. An Historical Overview of the
Framework of Dispossession of American
Blacks and the Need for Reparations
To tell the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social structure being changed from the bottom up. The extraordinary importance of this change is that it is willed, called for, demanded. The
need for this change exists in its crude state, impetuous and compelling, in the consciousness and in the lives of men and women
who are colonized. But the possibility of this change is equally
experienced in the form of a terrifying future in the consciousness of another “species” of men and women: the colonizers.18
The Transatlantic Slave trade,19 the beginning of Maafa,
the African Holocaust, lasted from the 15th century to the 19th
century, and brought enslaved Africans to America shortly after
the settlement of Jamestown, Virginia in 1607.20 The Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ended the practice of slavery in 1865 after the Civil War,21 though the marginalization of
Black people persisted long after. Through a series of de jure
and de facto mechanisms of racial segregation—manifested in
Southern Black Codes and Jim Crow laws,22 the practice of racial
discrimination continued throughout the country. These laws
marginalized Blacks, dispossessing them of civil and political
rights in fair trials23, enfranchisement24 and equality of education, and use of public and private facilities.25 The discriminatory
mechanisms also denied American Blacks economic, social, and
cultural rights, affecting their access to employment, housing and
property ownership, healthcare, the expression of their culture
and heritage, and their right to life, generally.26 Many of these
inequities continue, and their unequal effects are easily linked to
the enslavement and ownership of Africans.
These practices, resulting in the detachment of American Blacks as right-bearers, stakeholders, and full participants in
a purportedly democratic society, illustrated that access to citizenship and entitlement to rights required something more than
Black people possessed. This is evident because they were still
not guaranteed the full promise of these rights after the passage
of legislation and adoption of court rulings. Collectively, American Blacks continued to face structural impediments, not often
overcome by individual successes (though they are celebrated),
because of the traditional lack of value ascribed to the people.
This development of a Black underclass ultimately disconnects
Blacks from society.27 Whiteness,28 then, as a social construct
provided subjectively positive value, democratic participation,
and general acceptance in the society, particularly applied in connection with citizenship. This privilege is compounded by centuries of imperialism and concomitant devaluation of communities
of color, specifically the Black community.
Since America’s political and economic traditions are
based on a system of private property and capitalism, borne of
thinkers like John Locke, democratic participation is premised
on property ownership.29 Property is a natural right derived
through labor, with ownership contingent upon “useful” development and value of the land.30 This natural right31 precedes governmental sovereignty, based on a social contract in which the
people consent to being governed. As such, the government is
subject to the will and volition of the people32—presupposing
the people’s right to revolution.33 This ultimately connects fundamental rights (including the right to revolt or hold government
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accountable),34 democratic participation (governmental access
and engagement),35 and value (societal contribution and intrinsic
worthiness),36 to ownership of private property. The benefactors
of this oppressive structure designed it for their own success (and
continued success for their progeny) by directly exploiting37 and
dispossessing enslaved Africans of private property ownership
and depriving them of control over their own labor. The government sanctioned this system, and White society perpetuated it.
It deprived enslaved Africans of property ownership (inhered
value in this society)40 and subjected them to the expropriation
of their work.41 The direct result of this systemic marginalization
influenced the place Black people stand in today—deprivation
of access to democracy, citizenship, and participation in governmental functions,42 and the intrinsic value43 manifested in
subjective conceptions of cognizable societal contributions and
“earned” wealth.
Extending the elimination of American Blacks’ democratic participation for almost four centuries,44 these economic,
political, white supremacist, and governmental systems fundamentally led to the incapacitation of Black self-determination in
this country. The harm done is three-fold: (1) American Blacks
were denied value45 and worth, which in a zero-sum framework
of capitalism protects whiteness and privilege46 as a core value
(this dictated Black inability to engage in the development and
execution of the democratic and political processes that have sustained this society and government); (2) they were deprived of the
capacity to acquire capital and resources to sustain a living for
themselves and their descendants,47 and (3) they were deprived
of this right so long that there have not been sufficient gains to
overwhelm the ills designed to marginalize them.

IV. An Overview of the Fight for Reparations
for American Blacks
Mr. Backlash, Backlash who do you think I am. You raise my
taxes and freeze my wages, send my son to Vietnam. You give me
second-class houses, second-class schools; do you think that all
colored people are just second-class fools. Mr. Backlash, I’m
gonna leave you with the blues, yes I am. When I try to find a
job, to earn a little cash. All you got offer is your mean old white
backlash, but the world is big, big and bright and round. And
it’s full of other folks like me who are black, yellow, beige, and
brown. Mr. Backlash, I’m gonna leave you with the blues, yes I
am. When Langston Hughes died, when he died he told me many
months before, he said Nina keep on working till they open up the
door. And one of these days when you made it and the doors are
open wide, make sure you tell ‘em exactly where its at so they’ll
have no place to hide. So Mr. Backlash, Mr. Backlash, Hear me
now, someone in here, yeah somehow, someway. I’m gonna leave
you with the blues.48
The fight for Black reparations began in the 16th century in pre-colonial African rebellions, demanding reparations
for the enslaved Africans traded throughout the New World.49
The struggle was documented in other periods including: (1) preand post-Reconstruction, (2) the beginning of the 20th century,
(3) the Marcus Garvey Back to Africa Movement, (4) the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and (5) today, as the
post-Civil Liberties Act era, beginning in 1989.50 These periods
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brought about increasingly polarized attitudes, particularly during the pre- and post-Reconstruction periods and the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s.51 The existence of affirmative
action changed only the dialogue of reparations, and did not avert
the goals of those seeking repair for the damage caused by the
racially-perverse and oppressive systems under American governance, which diminished the collective capacity of American
Blacks for self-determination.
The pre- and post-Reconstruction reparations movements can be characterized in consonant terms with the movement of abolitionism. Not all abolitionists favored reparations
for enslaved Africans in the pre-Reconstruction period, or freedmen in the post-Reconstruction period. The central arguments for
reparations generated mostly from this group (though surely the
marginalized persons themselves were ardent supporters of reparations, an idea typically lost in the historical characterization,
as Levitt points out).52 In the pre-Reconstruction period, Special
Field Order No. 15 issued by General William Tecumseh Sherman, on January 16, 1865, provided that 485,000 acres of whiteowned land would be taken and redistributed to more than 18,000
newly freed Black families. This granted them possessory titles
to the land and settled them respectively, on 40-acre plots and the
loan of a federal government mule to work the land.53 General
Sherman did not have congressional authority but acted lawfully
under his power through the Freedman Act.54 In 1865, after the
assassination of President Lincoln, President Andrew Johnson
revoked the orders and pardoned many white Southerners for
their treasonous secession.55 The order became popularized56 in
American history, by proponents of reparations as the promise of
40-acres and a mule for Black families.57
White people became more vocal supporters of reparations for the enslaved African,58 as when Congressman Thaddeus
Stevens demanded land be redistributed to provide remedy to
American Blacks for the ills of slavery, and to combat one of
the central problems of the South: “a landed gentry and a landless proletariat.” 59 In 1861, Stevens introduced a bill to Congress
authorizing the President to seize Confederate lands to redistribute to the formerly enslaved Africans.60 In 1865, President
Johnson, reversed this legislative victory for enslaved Africans
and restored lands to their white antebellum owners.61 The reparations movement came to a halt in the 1880s as a result of his
stifling.62 Johnson’s actions single-handedly undermined the
beginning of the cause for Black reparations at a crucial point in
time, circumventing a true Reconstruction.
The reparations movement at the beginning of the
20th century persisted in various capacities. Industrialization of
Northern cities and the birth of Black ghettos encouraged the
growth of the movement in cities. The cause for Black reparations in rural and agrarian areas grew due to land reform during
Reconstruction, sharecropping, and partition, voluntary, and tax
sale of heirs’ property—all contributors to Black rural land loss
(all from the design of (White) business interests—protected and
facilitated by the American legal system).63 This played a significant role in the increasing marginalization of American Blacks.64
Reparations in this period were borne not just from past injustices, but from contemporary wrongs, including malicious government and complicit white-owned industry action against the
interests of American Blacks.
The reparations movement was simultaneously championed and eclipsed by the Marcus Garvey Movement. Marcus
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Garvey called for pan-Africanism of Black people and the formation of a Black homeland.65 This was the major focus of his
Universal Negro Improvement Association (“UNIA”).66 Garvey
also favored reparations for the exploitation of Black labor and
saw this as critical to generating funding for the creation a Black
homeland.67 But, the movement lost footing when Garvey was
indicted for mail fraud and deported to Jamaica68 (with much
speculation that his indictment was a political tactic by the White
power structure to defray Black economic and social mobility).
One of the Founders of UNIA, Queen Mother Audly Moore, continued championing the cause for reparations, and is commonly
recognized as the mother of reparations.69 She sought redress and
reparations of American Blacks through the American democratic
structure.70 Others focused on the attainment of civil and political rights, and this cause expanded in the subsequent period.
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, like
the turn of the century movement, included reparations for ills
perpetuated against American Blacks under the marginalizing
governmental structure, as part of the focus on economic development.71 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote:
No amount of gold could provide an adequate
compensation for the exploitation and humiliation of the Negro in America down through
the centuries . . . . Yet a price can be placed
on unpaid wages. The ancient common law has
always provided a remedy for the appropriation
of the labor of one human being by another.
This law should be made to apply for American
Negroes. The payment should be in the form of
a massive program by the government of special, compensatory measures, which could be
regarded as a settlement in accordance with the
accepted practice of common law.72
Though their mechanisms and means of attaining Black selfdetermination were different, both Dr. King and Malcolm X
agreed. Brother Malcolm contended:
If you are the son of a man who had a wealthy
estate and you inherit your father’s estate, you
have to pay off the debts that your father incurred
before he died. The only reason that the present
generation of white Americans are in a position of economic strength . . . is because their
fathers worked our fathers for over 400 years
with no pay . . . . We were sold from plantation
to plantation like you sell a horse, or a cow, or
a chicken, or a bushel of wheat . . . . All that
money . . . is what gives the present generation
of American whites the ability to walk around
the earth with their chest out . . . like they have
some kind of economic ingenuity. Your father
isn’t here to pay. My father isn’t here to collect. But I’m here to collect and you’re here to
pay.73
The Black Manifesto, penned at the National Black
Economic Development Conference74 in 1969 demanded, “Fifteen dollars per nigger,” or “$500 million from White Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues.” 75 James Forman, once leader
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of the Student Nonviolent CoordinatVI. Claims for Reparations
ing Committee (“SNCC”), contended
Through the
that this amount be assessed against
United States Legal Structure
the groups for their participation in the
The whole commerce between master and slave is a
exploitation of the American Negro
perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions,
who was, “kept in bondage and politthe most unremitting despotism on the one part, and
ical servitude and forced to work as
degrading submission on the other. Our children see
slaves by the military machinery and
this, and learn to imitate it; for man is an imitative
the Christian church working hand
animal . . . For in a warm climate, no man will labour
in hand.” 76 It is notable that, with
for himself who can make another labour for him. This
the deaths of civil rights leaders like
is so true, that of the proprietors of slaves a very small
Medgar Evers (1963), El Hajj Malik
proportion indeed are ever seen to labour. And can the
El-Shabazz (1965), and Dr. Martin
liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have
Luther King Jr. (1968), among others,
removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds
there was a strong collective support
of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God?
of reparations for American Blacks
That they are not to be violated but with his wrath?
within the Black community77 (with
Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that
some exceptions), but also by white
God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever: that
individuals and groups. This is remiconsidering numbers, nature and natural means only,
niscent of the Reconstruction period
a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of
where White abolitionists supported
situation, is among possible events: that it may become
Black reparations, probably because Photo credit unknown, Peter, an
probable by supernatural interference! 86
of the polarizing nature of the social enslaved Black man, whipped by
his overseer, taken April 12, 1863.
climate.
In examining the U.S. legal structure and conIn the post-Civil Liberties
Act era, there was renewed vigor in the reparations movement, sideration of reparations, two things must be considered: (1) will
after the passage of an act formally apologizing and provid- it actually work and (2) who will reap the benefits.87 The coming reparations to Japanese- Americans interned during World mitment (or lack thereof) to racial justice in the U.S. places those
War II.78 Though the marginalization of Japanese-Americans seeking repair from racial discrimination in a peculiar predicawas egregious, it did not arise to the level nor continue for the ment. Judging from the past, reparations through the U.S. legal
length of chattel slavery of enslaved Africans and the continued structure would prove useless since it has been U.S. law that has
marginalization of their descendants in America.79 Reparations oppressed American Blacks.88 This does not mean that reparaactivists felt that these reparations were a victory for marginal- tions will never be won, just that other avenues may need to be
ized groups, generally, but in some respect, represented contin- explored. Some contend that the difficulty in assessing whom
ued contempt for American Blacks, by acknowledging concrete reparations should benefit overcomes the need to provide them,
harms exacted against one group for a period of several years and but this does not justify the beneficiaries of these marginalizing
refusing the acknowledge the harm done to another—concrete institutional systems, keeping the ill-gotten wealth themselves.89
and enduring—for centuries.80 Though the Civil Liberties Act of In working towards a world without privilege, repair must be
1988 did nothing substantive for the goals of black reparations, it given to those so severely damaged.
Identifying plaintiffs for claims has not been as diffistill increased fervor for the cause.
In 1989, Representative John Conyers and in the early cult as opponents have depicted. The class of claims that have
1990s Massachusetts State Senator William Owens introduced been dismissed throughout the years have identified individuals
reparations legislation,81 that failed to garner enough support. or classes of people harmed by de jure and de facto discrimiConyers’ proposed legislation required the U.S. government to nation and racial segregation. For those who contend American
(1) acknowledge the fundamental inhumanity and injustice of constitutional and contractual issues of privity, standing, and
slavery, (2) establish a commission to study the effects of eco- nexus preclude damages outside of these structures, some sugnomic and racial discrimination against formerly enslaved Afri- gest examining the reparations issue in a broader perspective.
cans, (3) study the impact that these institutional disparities have Critical legal scholar Mari Matsuda suggests the structure below,
had, and (4) allow the Commission to make recommendations to similar to a class action suit:90
Congress for the redress of harm. Conyers has introduced HR
The standard legal
A claim in reparations
40 every year since.82 In the 21st century, many city councils
claim
resembles:
looks like this:
have passed resolutions to urge Congress to consider reparations
83
for slavery, in support of Conyers’ bill. Other coalitions have
Plaintiff A
Plaintiff Class A
organized to develop strategies on how best to pursue efforts for
(individual
victim)
(victim group members)
reparations.84 There have been many unsuccessful claims for
v.
v.
reparations for American Blacks in U.S. courts.85 The cases in
Defendant B
Defendant Class B
the following section had some measure of success or present a
(perpetrator of recent
(perpetrator descendants
unique opportunity to gain some ground in this struggle for repawrong-doing)
and current beneficiaries
rations, to counteract the pernicious system of marginalization
		
of past injustice)
that plagued American Blacks, and this country, for centuries.
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This is because according to Matsuda:
Several components of the standard legal claim
are not apart of the second illustration. First,
the horizontal intragroup connections are
absent. Not all members of the group are similarly situated. Some are rich, some poor. Some
feel betrayed, others do not. Some are easily
identified as group members, others have weak
claims to membership.

A. Individual Claims for Reparations
from American Blacks, Statutory Claims, and
Legislative Provisions for Reparations
But you did everything you could to be ill-informed by developing the art of forgetting.91
Civil suits for damages have been marginally more successful than claims for reparations from the ills of slavery. What
is unique about the following claims is that they seek reparations for ills not from slavery, but practices that deprived them of
resources already acquired, with the exception of the Ohio case.
These can be examined, then, as claims for restitution, which
are not very far-removed from claims of reparations, as they
are more akin to suits alleging race-based wrongdoing through
exploitation, deprivation, or marginalization, which are a kind
of Black reparations. Kennedy presents a unique parameter with
which to examine the future of reparations because it was a tortbased claim based solely on deprivation and access to a fundamental resource. The cases are included because it is beneficial
to examine attempts at restitution through the law for race-based
wrongs exacted against American Blacks, as many civil rights
cases were based on negative rights—government and industry restraint from discrimination and segregation—and positive
rights to the extent of provision of education, not recompense for
such wrongs.
a. Pigford v. Glickman :
Black Farmers

91

Reparations for

This case was a class-action lawsuit of Black farmers
from fifteen states against the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”).93 It resulted in a settlement of $2.25 billion awarded
to the plaintiffs for the denial of federal benefits,94 discriminatory USDA lending practices, and ultimately lost land for Black
farmers.95 The consent decree in the class-action suit was thought
“fair, adequate and reasonable” by Judge Paul L. Friedman, since
it provided discharge of farmers’ outstanding USDA debt, injunctive relief, and the receipt (for some) of $50,000 cash payments
(less $12,500 in taxes to the IRS).96 The Judge acknowledged,
however, that the case would “not undo all that has been done,” 97
since the 401 claimants named in the case98 only wanted their
land back.99
There are more than 66,000 Black farmers today who
were excluded when they missed notifications of the lawsuit in
1999.100 In February of 2005, some of them met with the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee on civil rights hearings,
hoping to urge Congress to develop a legislative solution to the
discriminatory practices.101 This case represents some recognition
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of wrongdoing and move towards recompense through the U.S.
legal structure. It has, however, failed to fundamentally address
the needs of the petitioners, evidenced by the value of land in
America102 in comparison with $37,500 allotments, especially
when a good tractor costs at least that much.
b. Kennedy, et al. v.
Every Drop Counts

City of Zanesville, et al.: 103

Sixty-seven of the Black residents of the predominantly Black neighborhoods of Coal Run and Langan Lane, Ohio
won a $10.9 million lawsuit104 against the local government
for intentionally denying them public water service for almost
fifty years,105 though they lived within one mile of public water
lines.106 White residents on the same street were extended the
public water service, and one of the Muskingum County Commissioners informed the Black residents that they would not get
water “until President Bush drops spiral bombs in the holler.” 107
This deprivation fundamentally speaks to the marginalization of
American Blacks.
c.

Rosewood, Florida: Recompense?

In 1923, a race riot occurred in Rosewood, Florida after
a White woman falsely claimed to have been raped by a Black
man.108 A mob of Whites took to the streets and destroyed an allBlack neighborhood, burning houses to the ground and killing
six Black residents.109 In 1994, the state of Florida passed the
Rosewood Compensation Act paying each of the nine survivors
of the tragedy $150,000, and establishing a college fund.110 The
Rosewood community, however, was never rebuilt, and twentyfive to thirty families lost their homes to the violence.111 Here
there was a failure to account for the economic value of all
losses. Again, we see that while debts must be assessed for egregious acts, monetary compensation does not account for making
persons whole again.
d. Alexander, et al. v.
Black Wall Street

Oklahoma, et al.: 112

In Tulsa, in 1921, a race riot was sparked on a similar
basis as that in Rosewood, Florida.113 A White woman alleged to
have been raped by a Black man (the veracity of the claim was
contested, but at this time the only proof of falsity was his word
against hers), and again a white mob took to the streets.114 Three
hundred people were killed and a good deal of the Greenwood
District, recognized as Black Wall Street, because of the prominence of its businesses and the accumulation of Black wealth,115
was destroyed.116 This included over 600 businesses, churches,
restaurants, movie theaters, libraries, schools, private airplanes,
a hospital, bank, and other public goods.117 The estimated property damage was $1.5 million (in early 20th century dollars), not
accounting for the loss of life and livelihood, and the cost of the
marginalization of Black people.118
A 2001 report by the state of Oklahoma assessed that
$12 million in damages should be awarded, but the state governor decried the ability of the state to pay for “past mass crime[s]
committed by its officials on the state’s behalf.”119 The Oklahoma
state legislature responded by passing the 1921 Tulsa Oklahoma
Race Riot Reconciliation Act, awarding more than 300 college
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scholarships to the descendants of Greenwood residents.120 A
lawsuit was filed by five of the elderly survivors with the assistance of Professor Charles Ogletree (Harvard law professor, former director of the Public Defender Service for the District of
Columbia) and the late Johnnie Cochran (represented OJ Simpson in his double-homicide case).121 The plaintiffs were more
interested in securing resources in education and healthcare than
financial capital,122 but their suit was thrown out. The courts cited
the exhaustion of the statute of limitations,123 and the Supreme
Court refused to grant certiorari. Professor Ogletree appealed
to Congress to extend the statute of limitations for the case,124
though there has not been a response to date.
Statutory and legislative provisions for reparations have
not gained winning ground, though they seem like viable sources.
None have been wholly successful as damages in individual suits
have at times proven. Damages have been grossly less than what
they should be. Statutory claims through citizen-suit provisions
have been less than marginally successful, but the most promising
options seem to be: (1) The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),
28 USC § 1346(b)(1); (2) The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; or (3) The Civil Rights Act of 1979, 28 U.S.C. § 1983.125
They each still require the constitutional meeting of standing and
jumping through the other hurdles as required by American jurisprudence.126 Still, the main problem with these statutes is in their
application.
The FTCA, commonly used for toxic torts claims, cannot overcome the retroactivity that only allows its use for harms
occurring after January 1, 1945.127 Though marginalization of
American blacks occurred after 1945, this presents a serious
impediment to obtaining the amounts owed by the beneficiaries of Black marginalization, including the American government since the 16th century. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 seems
more promising as it was designed to protect the rights of newly
enslaved Africans and their progeny.128 It is however, unlikely,
that this statute would prove helpful as the ensuing 142 years
since its adoption have been filled with the failure of the government (and at times government facilitation in marginalization) to
protect the rights of Black people from racial discrimination and
de jure and de facto segregation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1979, commonly known as
§ 1983,129 has not been helpful for Black people, particularly
in the criminal context. We consistently see the abuse of state
actors, particularly state police and prosecutorial misconduct
towards Black people in the civil, but particularly in the criminal
context. The recent Oscar Grant, Jena Six, Sean Bell, and Genarlow Wilson controversies and in a larger context, the failure of
the government to protect Blacks of the lower 9th Ward of New
Orleans in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina tragedy, demonstrate the abuse of state power against Blacks. In short, it is
not likely that § 1983 would be a viable source of reparations for
American Blacks.
The legislative capacity for reparations could be viable
if enough political capital is established. The historical actions of
this country and its responses to racial justice seem problematic
if seeking a result through this avenue; though it is more likely to
generate a result than a court ruling awarding Black reparations
for the harms of slavery. While we wait for the outcome of Alexander, to see if a Congressional extension of the statute of limitations is provided, we can look to the past successes within the
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political arena. As assessed with Representative Conyers’ efforts,
legislation too is a disappointing avenue of redress.

VII. Examination of Reparations Through
Specific Modes of International Law
While the U.S. is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),130 and can be held
accountable for violations under the auspices of its provisions
(particularly as a nation that adopted and agreed to respect human
rights),131 the Covenant requires the exhaustion of all state and
administrative remedies.132 As outlined above, citizen-suit provisions under specific statutes and civil suits for damages can be
wholly denied or granted in part. When suits are partially won,
this creates a greater challenge for remedies under the Covenant,
as the state has provided some sort of relief to the claimants.
Similar to the ICCPR state-party membership, the U.S. is
required to observe jus cogens peremptory norms under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).133 In this case,
the U.S. has continuously violated this provision by its systemic
and systematic discrimination against American Blacks. Again,
these claims must first be exhausted in federal courts,134 but this
is problematic because the U.S. debates the binding nature of the
UDHR.

VIII. Examination of Reparations Through
Covenant for the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”)

the

The U.S. became a state party to the Covenant for the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in
1994.135 The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination required all states parties
member to the Covenant to refrain from marginalization and the
denial of rights (negative rights) and to provide guarantees and
protection (positive rights) for everyone (not just citizens) in its
territories and under its jurisdiction.136 States parties must also
condemn propaganda against specific racial and ethnic groups,137
provide particular economic, social, and cultural, and civil and
political rights,138 incorporate “immediate and effective measures in the field of teaching, education, culture, and information”
with the intent of combating prejudice and promoting cultural
understanding,139 and provide remedies through its courts, legislation, and institutions,140 among other very progressive measures.141 While CERD provides the opportunity for state parties
to denounce their membership in writing (effective one year after
the date of receipt by the UN Secretary-General)142 and does
not provide for military force, the phenomenon of globalization
places an incredible amount of pressure on states, particularly
Western states (specifically those who denounce other nations
for their human rights violations) to preserve some semblance of
equality for their own legitimacy and transparency in the global
socio-political marketplace.
CERD also has the force of requiring states parties
to submit reports to the Committee every two years.143 They
accept reports from groups and individuals claiming to be victims of actions by states parties,144 though petitioners must have
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exhausted all domestic remedies before seeking redress through
CERD (this is not so if domestic proceedings have been unnecessarily long).145 The Committee also views reports of non-profit
organizations and others citing issues prevalent in the state party
with respect to CERD to give them a more full picture of happenings there. States parties must also undergo review by the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
comprised of eighteen committee members of “good moral
standing.”146 Committee members are those serving of their own
accord and not nationals to the particular state party under review.
The Committee submits recommendations and the state party
must submit written explanations or statements of clarification
citing how they have complied with the recommendations by providing remedies for violations or explaining how they will.147
CERD, then, as a mechanism requiring some accountability and transparency from its states parties, provides a more
hopeful measure for American Blacks to seek recourse through
reparations, particularly with an international audience. As a
party to CERD the U.S. is subject to Committee Evaluations and
reports after the submission of their reports148 and since reports
are designed to monitor the success of states in eliminating racial
discrimination within its jurisdiction, they provide powerful evidence of an entire nation’s noncompliance with the Covenant,
their racial inequities, generally, and recourse for wronged parties. The Committee of CERD has found multiple violations for
the two reports the American government has submitted since
enacting the international provision (it should have been eight
reports by 2009 since the U.S.’s membership in 1994, though
the U.S. submitted its fourth, fifth, and sixth report in a single
document). It seems likely that the problems found by the Committee will be helpful in developing the contentions for which
American Blacks seek redress. The Committee commented on
the disproportionate amount of Blacks and Latinos incarcerated
in America’s jails and prisons, as well as police brutality, particularly applied to minorities.149
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The Committee also highlighted the severe disparity in
access and retention of education and employment (particularly
because affirmative action has been under attack), in addition to
discriminatory housing and lending practices, racial profiling,
zero tolerance and three strikes measures that disparately impact
minorities (Blacks and Latinos in particular), voter discrimination
and disenfranchisement, violence against migrants and minority
women, abuse of non-citizens during detention, racial bias in
capital punishment, failure to enforce federal ameliorative statutes, inferior provision of healthcare/medical services disparately
impacting minorities and women, diminished protection of workers’ rights, and insufficient provision of civil remedies, among
many other problematic and systemic violations of CERD.150 In
its most recent 2007 report to the CERD Committee, the U.S.
mentions Hurricane Katrina in relation to equitable housing stating that, “concern has been expressed about the disparate effects
of Hurricane Katrina on housing for minority residents of New
Orleans,” asserting that, commentators found that Katrina was a
result of “poverty (i.e. the inability to evacuate) rather than racial
discrimination per se.”151 As if the two could be separated into
clean boxes whereby those victimized by government and other
designers and beneficiaries of the oppressive systems and structures, get to choose how they are discriminated against—either
by race or class. More often than not in this country, the latter is
informed by the former, and they are inextricably bound to one
another. In this respect, reparations provide an interesting dimension to examine this privileged denial of blame, fault, or benefit against the marginalization of Black people, people of color,
poor people, and particularly poor people of color. In this respect,
CERD has been useful in requiring some kind of response for the
blatant and disparate treatment of American Blacks.
The most attractive prospect of CERD’s vitality in the
cause for reparations is the Committee’s indictment of the U.S.
on its interpretation of no violation for actions that have not been
proven to be intentionally discriminatory despite their impact.152
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This particular aspect seems encouraging because the standard
for proving intentional discrimination domestically, essentially
requires the demonstration of malintent almost through the certainty of physical documentation, because the domestic impact
standard is so limited. It does not account for the subjective and
normative sociological orientations of humans injected into their
laws and their interpretation of them. The truth is that this critical part of examining harms against groups based on the impact
of racial prejudice (instead of the victimized demonstrating the
intent of the victimizer) is unlikely to become inhered in the
American system of jurisprudence. This is particularly because
of the state of race relations in this country, and the status of
Black people today.
Among other ills plaguing the Black community, in
2004, 25% of Black people were living below the poverty line,153
since 2007, 40.9% of America’s prisons and jails were populated
with Black bodies with Blacks incarcerated at rates 5.6 times that
of Whites,154 and recent Supreme Court cases affirmed limitations on voluntary integration,155 a severe detriment to Black
education when taken in conjunction with the reality of no fundamental right to education or second look given to educational
funding as a means of de facto segregation.156 To boot, the latter
is exacerbated by laws like No Child Left Behind, which absolve
government of responsibility to provide critical educational funding, good teachers, and adequate school buildings, among other
critical entities, to facilitate the learning and engagement process
of Black children. The effect of connecting such a dire reality
(with empirical illustration) to systemic harms caused by chattel
slavery and harms perpetuated by this society, is too hard a pill

to swallow for the beneficiaries of this system. As such, while
CERD is seemingly an attractive legal prospect for remedying
harms, it serves more as a public, international indictment of the
U.S.’s refusal to eliminate forms of racial discrimination, and the
country’s continued commitment to racial injustice.
The problematic application of CERD is again, the
requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted,157 which
places the precarious nature of the condition of a people back
into the domestic courts that have not time and again failed
them. One hope is that in the increasingly global politicization
of nations, more care will be given to the perception of domestic
policy abroad. Though the past eight years have been even more
difficult generally, hope for grassroots leadership at this juncture to play a critical role in remedying past wrongs and current
marginalization, seems more feasible. It is understood that movements come from the bottom up—not just with presidencies or
Congressional majorities and the same is true for the success of
securing reparations for the marginalization of American Blacks.
For whether the battle for reparations is won or not, the penultimate goal of carving out the self-determination of Black people
will provide the peace and begin the healing the community so
desperately needs.

IX. Epilogue
I want my people to be free, to be free, to be free, want
black people to be free, to be free, to be free. . . . That’s all that
matters to me, that’s all that matters to me.
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(2004).
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enslavement of Black people in America with the passage of House Joint Resolution 728 in 2007, on the 400th anniversary of the settlement of Jamestown.
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22 Ronald L. F. Davis, From Terror to Triumph: Historical Overview, available
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15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the National Voting Rights Act of
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voter intimidation of non-state actors, roll-purging, and literacy tests designed to
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(outlawing race as a mechanism for not selling or renting), there are no provisions to provide access to either of these “protections” or any other of the
above-mentioned. Though the creation of federal government entities monitor
the implementation of the law, respectively the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in their existence, discriminatory practices still persist, and there
is no available mechanism for access to these entities.
27 Jeremy Levitt, Black African Reparations: Making A Claim for Enslavement
and Systematic De Jure Segregation and Racial Discrimination Under International Law, 25 S.U. L. Rev. 7 (1997).
28 Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack (1988),
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Teachers 169, 169-177 (Alexandra Miletta and Maureen Miletta, ed., 2008)
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Whiteness enables a certain level of comfort for its beneficiaries to the direct
disadvantage of others, while creating a society that ignores this privilege and
provides the added benefit of touting a meritocracy when no such system, in fact
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without being called a credit to one’s race; the certainty that asking to speak to
a person in charge (anywhere) that the person will be of your race; the ability
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of life, public, institutional, and social; among other facts not listed here, or in
the fifty tenets by McIntosh, are benefits of whiteness. Such systems are active
and embedded, and must be deconstructed and examined to assess whether
the privilege encompasses a facet of life that should be enjoyed by all, or is
simply an unearned power that has no place in society. McIntosh recommends
consciousness and raising levels of saliency and awareness to begin this process
of reversal or the unpacking of the white privilege knapsack).
29
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imperialist attitudes about resources, people, and value) and could foray into a
discussion of the underlying accepted natural law and economic principles on
which he bases his theories of property to deconstruct this premise, I use this to
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society are accepted, the dispossession of American Blacks that follows is still
counter in theory to this proto-capitalistic law/labor/land principle. John Locke,
Of Property, in Second Treatise of Civil Government, § 45 (1690).
30 Id. §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
31 Id.
32 Id. § 42.
33 John Locke, Of the Ends of Political Society and Government, in Second
Treatise of Civil Government, § 123 (1690); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (providing “[t]hat whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
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to effect their Safety and Happiness.”).
34 John Locke, Of Civil and Political Society, in Second Treatise of Civil
Government, § 90 (1690).
35 Id. § 123.
36 Locke, supra note 33, § 45.
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ephemeral, while acknowledging their existence. It seems odd to describe the
condition of a people as short in duration when systems are designed to continually oppress them, and ironic when his theories were central in legitimating this
oppression. Locke’s other theories connecting property, government, and political participation, too, create the inescapable condition of chattel slavery at worst
and involuntary servitude and feudalism at best.
38 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (stating that originally, the Constitution demonstrated
that slaves could not have ownership or possession even in themselves, because
they were not whole persons. This clause details the tax apportionment and
elected representation in the House of Representatives to the exclusion of
“three-fifths of all other persons,” a legacy of the compromise between Northern
and Southern States at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 in developing the
Constitution, to count enslaved Africans and their Black progeny as three-fifths
of persons for purposes of maintaining a Southern relevance in national politics,
but discounting the status of Blacks as whole persons in order to sustain slavery.
This clause was rendered moot after the passage of the 13th Amendment); see
Angela Davis, The Legacy of Slavery: Standards for a New Womanhood, in
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subjugation of the enslaved Africans monetarily and sociologically, and still do
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40 Locke, supra note 29, §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
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Further, the Black intellectual and creative capacities were co-opted for the
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42 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
43 Locke, supra note 29, §§ 32-35, 38, 39, 40.
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A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought
to this country and sold as slaves, is not a “citizen” within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States. When the
Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the
States as members of the community, which constituted the State,
and were not numbered among its “people or citizens.” Consequently, the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens
do not apply to them [ . . . ] The only two clauses in the Constitution which point to this race treat them as persons whom it was
morally lawfully to deal in as articles of property and to hold
as slaves. Since the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States no State can by any subsequent law make a foreigner or
any other description of persons citizens of the United States,
nor entitle them to the rights and privileges secured to citizens by
that instrument. A State, by its laws passed since the adoption of
the Constitution, may put a foreigner or any other description of
persons upon a footing with its own citizens as to all the rights
and privileges enjoyed by them within its dominion and by its
laws. But that will not make him a citizen of the United States,
nor entitle him to sue in its courts, nor to any of the privileges
and immunities of a citizen in another State. The change in
public opinion and feeling in relation to the African race which
has taken place since the adoption of the Constitution cannot
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Cutting Funds for Oral Contraceptives:
Violation of Equal Protection Rights and the Disparate
Impact on Women’s Healthcare
By
Rachel V. Rose*

Introduction
Cutting funding for oral contraceptives has far reaching
implications for women, including adverse impacts on women’s
health, negative economic impacts on society, and constitutional violations. In a country whose governmental health plans
(Medicare and Medicaid) reimburse men’s costs for Viagra®,1 it
is hardly appropriate to deny women access to prescribed oral
contraceptives that have traditionally been defined as supplementary services falling under the umbrella of primary care.2 Due
to the wording of a provision within the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005, some contend that non-profit clinics and campus health
centers can no longer offer oral contraceptives at reduced rates.3
This article will show how decreasing funding for oral contraceptives violates equal protection and embodies a disparate impact
in relation to women’s health for Medicaid and Title X beneficiaries—low-income Americans who would benefit from access to
contraceptives and other preventative health-care services.
Part I of this article addresses the history, uses, and economics of oral contraceptives. Part II highlights the government’s
role and policies in funding oral contraceptives over the past 35
years. Part III discusses the present regulatory landscape, including The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”), the Department
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) proposed regulations,
Prevention Through Affordable Access Act, and Title X. Finally,
Part IV shows how the history, politics, and regulations culminate
in a violation of the Constitutional right to equal protection.

I. Oral Contraceptives: History,
Uses, Economics
A. History
Oral contraceptives are relatively recent forms of contraception.4 Between 1950 and 1954, Gregory Pincos, a scientist,
and John Rock, a renowned Harvard obstetrician and gynecologist, developed a chemical contraceptive and performed the first
human clinical trial.5 The “Pill” regime that they established (21
days on progesterone to inhibit ovulation, 7 days to menstruate)
is still in use today.6 The “Pill,” called Enovid, was approved by
the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for the
treatment of severe menstrual disorders.7
In the 1960’s, the FDA approved the first oral birth control pill.8 The FDA required Searle pharmaceutical company
to complete field trials for all doses of its oral contraceptive,
Enovid.9 Ortho Pharmaceutical introduced its first oral contraceptive in 1963. By 1965 the “Pill” became the leading method
of pre-conceptual and reversible contraception in the United
States.10
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During the 1970’s, United States Senator Gaylord
Nelson convened Senate hearings on the safety of the “Pill.”11
The FDA ordered that all oral contraceptive packages contain
information detailing possible side effects.12 By 1988, the FDA
recognized additional potential benefits of oral contraceptives,
including decreased incidence of the following: ovarian cancer,
endometrial cancer, pelvic inflammatory disease, ovarian cysts,
and benign breast disease.13
In the twenty years since the FDA recognized additional
potential benefits of oral contraceptives, manufacturers have
received FDA approval to use oral contraceptives for the treatment of acne and for the severe condition of premenstrual dysmorphic disorder (“PMDD”).14 Oral contraceptives have been
used to treat a variety of conditions and are proven to positively
affect many aspects of women’s health, including preserving
fertility.

B. Uses and Benefits of Birth Control Pills
Over the past 50 years, the FDA has recognized potential benefits in the area of women’s health, such as decreased
incidence of the following: ovarian cancer, endometrial cancer,
pelvic inflammatory disease, ovarian cysts, mid-cycle pain (dysmenorea), heavy bleeding and benign breast disease.15 Manufacturers have also received FDA approval to distribute oral
contraceptives for the treatment of acne and for PMDD.16 Physicians regularly prescribe oral contraceptives for other debilitating conditions such as polycystic ovarian syndrome (“PCOS”),
and endometriosis.17 These conditions, as well as PMDD, may
cause irregular menstrual cycles, increased risk of high blood
pressure, diabetes, high cholesterol, and infertility. These physical and emotional conditions may be mitigated by taking oral
contraceptives, which are proven to preserve fertility.
One of the most threatening conditions to a woman’s
fertility is endometriosis, a condition in which deposits of endometrium (uterine lining) are found outside the uterus.18 It is a
common disorder, yet it is one of the most enigmatic gynecologic
diseases.19 Endometriosis occurs when endometrial tissue outside
the uterus responds to changes in hormones,20 breaking down and
bleeding like the lining of the uterus does during the menstrual
cycle.21 This breakdown of tissue often creates adhesions (scar
tissue), which causes tremendous pain and binds surrounding
organs together.22 Aside from surgery, the most common way to
control symptoms of endometriosis and shrink existing implants
is through the use of oral contraceptives.23
As indicated, the uses of oral contraceptives extend
far beyond the indication for contraception. Ironically, PMDD,
PCOS, and endometriosis have been shown to cause infertility.24
Oral contraceptives, however, have been shown to temper these
conditions enabling a woman to retain her reproductive abilities.25
23

C. The Economics of Birth Control

pharmaceutical companies providing covered outpatient drugs are
required to calculate and submit to CMS, is not affected by the
The present cost of oral contraceptives is high.26 The increase in customary portion of the new formula were directed
cost to society, however, of preventing college students and low- at how pharmacies would be reimbursed.46 The Office of the
income women from purchasing them at a reduced rate is even Inspector General (“OIG”) and the General Accounting Office
higher.27 In 2004, researchers estimated a net public savings of (“GAO”) found that this new formula may “result in reimburse$4.3 billion by clinics through averting 1.4 million unintended ments to pharmacies that are below pharmacy acquisition costs.”
pregnancies.28 This number does not include the costs of infertil- Specifically, the DRA of 2005 requires manufacturers to report
ity treatments or the cost to treat the escalation of other diseases AMP and Best Price to CMS on a monthly basis compared to the
(Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease) not associated with previous quarterly basis and imposes several important changes
regarding AMP and Best Price calculations.47 However, the act
PMDD, PCOS, and endometriosis.29
Funding from Medicaid programs and Title X of the Pub- has a provision that extends the “exclusion of customary prompt
lic Health Service Act has helped millions of women maintain a pay discounts [to wholesalers].” 48 This means that the AMP is
not affected by the increase in customary
healthy reproductive life.30 In fact, almost
prompt pay wholesaler discounts.49 Thereseventeen million women in the United
Yet,
despite
these
health
fore, the language should have no effect
States utilized these publicly subsidized
services in 2002.31 The federal and state benefits and substantial savings, on pharmaceutical manufacturers ability
to continue providing oral contraceptives
governments spent a combined $1.26 bilthe government enacted a
to public health and campus health clinlion on reversible contraceptive services.32
provision that has forced
ics, because the prices these facilities pay
Yet, despite these health benefits and substantial savings, the government enacted a pharmaceutical companies to are not included in the AMP, Best Price, or
ceiling price calculations.
provision that has forced pharmaceutical
stop providing oral
Equally important is the limitation
companies to stop providing oral contracontraceptives at reduced rates. that certain entities will be excluded from
ceptives at reduced rates.33
the calculation of the AMP and the “rebate
At a time when demand for subsidized contraceptives has increased, public funding for family percentage” on which pharmaceutical companies base their profplanning clinics has stagnated.34 Exacerbating this situation is the its.50 These entities include those defined in section 340B(a)(4)
unwillingness of many pharmaceutical companies to continue to of the Public Health Service Act; intermediate facilities for the
provide oral contraceptives to the public system funded by Title mentally retarded; a State-owned or operated nursing facility;
X at a relatively low cost.35 This appears to be the result of the and any other entity determined by the Secretary of DHHS to be
2005 DRA revamping the average manufacturer price (“AMP”) a safety net provider.51 The Office of Pharmacy Affairs oversees
formula and altering the 340B drug-pricing program. The Omni- the 340B pricing program and its administration.52 Entities that
bus Reconciliation Act of 1990 established AMP and Best Price have been identified as qualifying 340B organizations under the
for use in the Medicaid program.36 Thereby, sales by a manufac- Social Security Act and the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”)
turer of covered outpatient drugs below ten percent of AMP were include: federally-qualified health centers; a family planning
generally excluded from Best Price.37 In 1992, the 340B program project receiving a grant or contract under Section 1001 of the
that was created when the Public Health Services Act (“PHSA”) PHSA; and any entity receiving assistance under section 318 (42
was amended to require pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide USCS § 247c) (relating to the treatment of sexually transmitted
diseases).53
prescription drugs at reduced prices to “covered entities.” 38
Even if campus health centers do not qualify as 340B
Calculating pharmaceutical costs for a 340B program
is a semi-complex formula based on the AMP that is provided to organizations, the Secretary of DHHS has the discretion to deterthe Center for Medicare/Medicaid Services (“CMS”).39 AMP is mine what facilities qualify as safety net providers to which the
defined as “[t]he average price paid to manufacturers by wholesal- sales of drugs at nominal prices would be appropriate based upon
ers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade.” 40 four factors.54 The factors are: 1) facility or entity type; 2) the
The lowest price available from “the manufacturer to any whole- nature of the services provided; 3) the patient population served;
saler, retailer, provider, health maintenance organization, or non- and 4) the number of other facilities or entities eligible to purprofit or government entity, with some exceptions” is considered chase at nominal prices in the same service area.55 Based upon
the Best Price.41 Although Best Price is required to be reduced these criteria, it is reasonable for the Secretary to include campus
to account for price adjustments such as rebates and discounts, it health centers as qualifying entities.
By interpreting the language to mean a 340B qualidoes not include prices charged to certain federal purchasers.42
The two factors involved in calculating 340B price are the AMP fying facility does not include community health and college
and a “rebate percentage” (consideration of both the AMP and health centers as an exclusion when calculating the AMP and the
the Best Price reported to CMS).43 This calculation is the “ceil- “rebate percentage,” and interpreting the language that exempts
ing price” formula for brand name pharmaceuticals (AMP for the certain “safety net providers” to exclude family planning clinics;
previous month—15.1% discount off the AMP) considered by pharmaceutical manufacturers, including Organon, the maker of
Cyclessa® and Desogen® oral contraceptives, made an economic
CMS.44
Beginning in 2007, seemingly small language changes decision not to provide drugs at a discounted rate.56 Despite the
in the DRA impacted the calculation of AMP, Best Price, and company being unhappy about increasing the prices for colleges,
limited the number of facilities that qualify for discounted “Nick Hart, Organon’s executive director of contraception, says
prices on birth control.45 The concerns over that the AMP, which they were forced to make ‘a business decision’ after the law went
24
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into effect.” 57 As a result, women who were paying between
$3–$10 per month for oral contraceptives are now paying nearly
900% more for the same prescription.58
Sadly, this price increase was unnecessary. The decision of pharmaceutical companies to stop offering low-priced
oral contraceptives to health centers and clinics was an independent decision that the DRA of 2005 did not mandate.59 On
the contrary, four types of entities, including 340B qualifying
facilities and certain safety net providers determined by the Secretary of DHHS, were excluded from the best price determination (meaning that pharmaceuticals offered at reduced rates to
these four types of entities would not be included in the price
determination).60 Additionally, Congress passed a provision to
delay the application of new payment limits for multiple source
drugs under Medicaid until September 30, 2009.61 Therefore, the
AMP or the “ceiling price” is not impacted by the DRA.62
Pharmaceutical companies’ interpretations of the DRA
of 2005 have affected over three million college and low-income
women.63 Many hard-working women can no longer access FDA
approved methods of birth control, including oral contraceptives.64 The only entities benefiting are manufacturers and savvy
entrepreneurs through higher prices and arbitrage opportunities.65
Overall, there is no logical explanation for repealing access to
low price oral contraceptives based on the statutory language of
the DRA of 2005.

II. Government Funding and Policies Related
to Oral Contraceptives

Under the Reagan Administration, public and nonprofit
entities encountered a setback in funding, in light of the conflicting interpretations of Title X equating oral contraception with
surgical abortions.75 However, the language, on its face, confirms
that the intent of Congress was not to equate the two.
In 1988, the Secretary of DHHS promulgated new regulations to differentiate between Title X programs and abortions,76
emphasizing that “the purpose and the demonstrated effect of contraceptive counseling is to promote the use of contraception.” 77
Unfortunately, DHHS also adopted regulations (the “Gag Rule”)
prohibiting Title X facilities from providing information, counseling, or referrals concerning abortions.78 During the first 18
years of the Title X program, the Act was interpreted to mean that
the funds could not be used to perform abortions, but it did not
restrict the ability of clinics to provide counseling or referrals.79
In 1991, the Supreme Court stipulated that, by clearly
defining “family planning,” the regulations clarify that Congress
intended Title X funds to be expended to support preventive family planning services.80 According to the General Accounting
Office, the majority of clients of Title X-sponsored clinics are not
pregnant and their services include and were restricted to physical examinations, education on contraceptive methods, preconceptional counseling, and general reproductive healthcare.81 The
Clinton Administration recognized that, while abortions are not a
method of family planning, the “Gag Rule” endangered women’s
lives and health by preventing them from receiving accurate medical information from their physicians.82 Consequently, the “Gag
Rule” was repealed.83

It is hard to fathom that President Dwight Eisenhower
III. The Present Regulatory Landscape’s
stated in 1959 that birth control “is not a proper political or govRole in the Crisis
ernment activity or function or responsibility” and emphatically
added that it is “not our business.” 66 Only five years later, PresiWithout publicly funded clinics providing contraceptive
dent Lyndon B. Johnson pushed legislation for federal support services, there would be 1.4 million more unintended pregnanof birth control for the poor.67 During the Nixon administration, cies and 49% more abortions annually in the United States.84
this trend continued.68 Title X of the PubMoreover, for every $1.00 spent to provide
lic Health Services Act (“Family Planning
services in the nationwide network of pubWithout publicly funded
Services and Population Research Act of
licly funded clinics, $4.02 is saved in Med1970”) authorized the Secretary to make clinics providing contraceptive icaid birth costs.85
grants to and enter into contracts with pubUnfortunately, the pharmaceutiservices, there would be
lic or nonprofit private entities to assist in
cal companies’ unwillingness to offer oral
the establishment and operation of volun- 1.4 million more unintended contraceptives at nominal prices to publicly
tary family planning projects, appropriat- pregnancies and 49% more funded clinics has created a birth control cri86
ing $180 million between 1971 and 1973.69
abortions annually in the sis. Now, millions of women are paying up
The only method of birth control not
to nine or ten times what they were paying
United States.
entitled to funds was a surgical abortion
before, if they can afford it.87 The compabecause it was not considered a preventive
nies’ decisions undermine the benefits under
family planning service.70 Under the Ford Administration, Con- Title X and are detrimental individually on women’s reproductive
gress extended grants for comprehensive public health services71 health and collectively on our nation’s economic welfare.88
and expressly defined “community health centers” as entities that
provide primary health services and referrals to providers of supA. Title X v. DRA
plementary health services.72 Primary health services included
Statutes or provisions relating to the same individual
family planning, and supplemental health services included pharmaceutical and health education services.73 The Secretary could or class of individuals, or to a closely allied subject or object
89
“make grants to public and nonprofit private entities for projects may be regarded under the rule of in pari materia, to ascerto plan and develop community health centers which will serve tain and effectuate Congressional intent by proceeding upon the
medically underserved populations.” 74 Clearly, there was a com- supposition that several statutes were governed by one spirit and
90
mitment to ensure that women received the care and treatment policy and were intended to be consistent and harmonious.
In the present case, Title X and section 6001 of the DRA, both
they needed to preserve their reproductive health.
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provisions related to funding, should be read together for the
intent of providing funding so all women could have access to
reproductive healthcare, family planning, and preconceptional
birth control.91

1. Title X: Settled Policy
Since 1970, the purpose of Title X has been to assist in
making voluntary family planning services available to all persons by enabling public and non-profit private entities to plan and
develop comprehensive programs. Understanding the need for a
high standard for ethical delivery of services, Title X required
that clients be offered a broad range of contraceptive methods.92
Today, Title X supports approximately 4,400 out of 7,700 family
planning clinics, serving nearly five million women.93 The current guidelines were developed in conjunction with the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (“ACOG”) and require
a complete physical exam (including Pap test) and education
about the importance of preventive care.94 Title X is indicative
of settled policy that women should have access to reproductive
healthcare, family planning, and preconceptional birth control.

2. 2005 DRA – Effective January 2007
An unintended consequence of the DRA, specifically
Section 6001, is that health centers no longer receive prescription
contraceptives at a nominal or base price. Because there is a provision in the DRA that insulated publicly funded health clinics
from paying a higher premium and in turn exempted these prices
from the AMP calculations, there is no acceptable explanation
for this consequence. The only explanation proffered by the pharmaceutical companies is that they made a “business decision” to
no longer follow established legislative precedent. Furthermore,
Congress has done nothing since the implementation of the DRA
to rectify the situation. The result is that the objective of Title X
and Medicaid is being undermined while pharmaceutical manufacturers are realizing higher profit margins.
The provisions in section 6001 of the DRA should be
construed to mean that because of the “safe harbor” exempting
nominal sales pricing to certain entities from being included in
the calculation, Congress intended to preserve the Title X objective, while not adversely impacting the reimbursement of pharmaceuticals through Medicaid. It is imperative that Congress
continue to uphold the original legislative intent of providing
access to high quality contraceptive services and preventive care
to young and low-income citizens.95

B. DHHS Initiatives to Undermine Women’s
Reproductive Healthcare Funding
In the summer of 2008, the Bush Administration called
on DHHS to draft new rules that would severely restrict women’s
healthcare options by defining “abortion” so broadly that it would
encompass many types of birth control, including oral contraceptives.96 The DHHS proposal defined abortion as “any of the
various procedures—including the prescription, dispensing and
administration of any drug or the performance of any procedure
or any other action—that results in the termination of the life of
a human being in utero between conception and natural birth,
whether before or after implantation.” 97 This definition defies
26

Congressional intent and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
abortion.98
In addition to posing serious threats to the reproductive
health of millions of uninsured and low-income Americans, the
language could prevent health facilities from guaranteeing their
patients access to the full range of comprehensive reproductive
healthcare.99 On July 15, 2008, several Senators signed a letter
addressed to the Secretary of DHHS urging reconsideration of
the regulations.100 One argument was that the proposed definition would allow common forms of contraception such as the
birth control pill to be classified as abortion, thereby denying
contraception to women who need it.”101 In a follow-up letter,
they emphasized the medical definition of pregnancy,102 specifically that a pregnancy does not begin until a fertilized egg
implants itself to the uterine wall,103 and most modern forms of
birth control work by blocking implantation.104 Calling a preimplanted fertilized egg a “human being in utero” is incorrect.105
Ultimately, confusing the definitions of contraception and abortion would wreak havoc on law, regulations, and policy.106

C. Prevention Through Affordable Access Act
The Prevention Through Affordable Access Act was
introduced in the House of Representatives107 to clarify any ambiguity in the DRA language and protect student health centers and
public or nonprofit private entities providing health services.108
It received bipartisan support and aimed to “rectify an allegedly
flawed condition in the DRA, which caused national pharmaceutical companies to stop selling birth control to college clinics [and
publicly funded health clinics] at discounted prices.”109 Both the
House and the Senate versions of the bill were introduced and
referred to Committees nearly a year ago.110 No other action has
been taken since the initial introduction.111

IV. The 2005 DRA – Violation of Equal
Protection
In December 1961, it was still a crime to use birth control in Connecticut.112 Boldly, C. Lee Buxton, M.D. and Estelle
Griswold opened four Planned Parenthood Clinics.113 Their arrest
brought national attention to anachronistic state laws, which culminated in a 7–2 ruling by the United State Supreme Court that
Connecticut’s law prohibiting the use of birth control was unconstitutional, violating a couple’s right to privacy.114 Eisenstadt v.
Baird made it clear that a state cannot impede the distribution of
birth control to an unmarried person, thus striking down a Massachusetts law.115 Less than a year later, the Supreme Court ruled
on one of the most controversial issues of our time—abortion.116
These judicial precedents not only set the tone for the adoption
of Title X, but also laid the foundation for recognizing women as
a protected class.

A. Equal Protection Analysis
The fundamental question under consideration is
whether there is something in the DRA requiring pharmaceutical
companies to no longer offer nominal pricing on oral contraceptives to public, non-profit, and campus health clinics. The Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides
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that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.117
When assessing a statute under an intermediate scruFundamentally, equal protection deals with “governmental clas- tiny level of review, two operative parts must be considered—
sifications that deprive a certain class of persons of benefits that the “means” and the “ends.”130 The “ends” or the objective the
persons in other classes are entitled to receive, or that subject government seeks to achieve must be actual and important. The
a certain class of persons to burdens that are not imposed on “means” or the classification the government has used must be
persons in other classes.”118 By making oral contraceptives “substantially related” to the ends. Here, the means (the genderunavailable because of the exorbitant cost, women are the class based reproductive health access exclusion) and the ends (preof persons being deprived of benefits of reproductive healthcare sumably, reducing Medicaid spending by $4.7 billion between
and family planning they are entitled to under Medicaid and Title 2006–2010) can be compared to United States v. Virginia, where
X.119 Although men also use the same federally funded centers, the Supreme Court subjected Virginia Military Institute’s (“VMI”)
they do not carry the burden of paying more for prescriptions male-only admissions policy to intermediate scrutiny.131
under the DRA.
The Court determined that Virginia’s male-only admisOn its face, the DRA does not discriminate because it sions policy to VMI was not “substantially related” to the
contains no explicit gender classification language.120 However, state’s objective of maintaining the adversative method, and the
just because it is facially neutral does not mean it is free from dis- objective of educating “citizen soldiers” was not “substantially
crimination. The difference is that courts will not merely assume advanced by women’s categorical exclusion, in total disregard
that the DRA is intentionally discriminatory; instead, evidence of their individual merit.”132 Likewise, the federal government’s
of discrimination must be found through its administration and gender-based reproductive health access exclusion in the DRA
purpose or effect.121 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court is not “substantially related” to the objective of spending reducheld that even if a law “be fair on its face and impartial in its tion. For every tax dollar spent on contraceptive services, $3.00
appearance, [equal protection will still be violated] if it is applied in Medicaid costs for pregnancy-related healthcare and medical
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an care of newborns is saved, 1.3 million unplanned pregnancies are
unequal hand.”122 There, equal protection was denied when the avoided, and without publicly supported services, there would be
discrimination and public administration of the law was found an annual increase of 40% more abortions.133 Furthermore, the
to be illegal.
DRA defies the purpose of other statutes, Title X and Medicaid,
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney which have ensured women’s affordable access to oral contracepdealt with discriminatory intent in the purpose and effect of a law tives in relation to reproductive health and family planning for
giving preferential treatment to veterans.123 There, the Supreme over a quarter of a century. When a heightened level of scrutiny is
Court asserted that proof of discriminatory “impact provides ‘an applied, economic reasons are not enough to uphold a statute as
important starting point,’ but purposeful discrimination is the constitutional. Therefore, in terms of the DRA, the government
condition that offends the Constitution.”124
has failed to demonstrate the requisite “exceedingly persuasive
The DRA must be considered in pari materia with Title justification” for denying women access to affordable oral conX and Medicaid when considering the administration and pur- traceptives to which they are entitled under federal law.134
pose and effect of the law. The situation of women being denied
A final step in the “means/ends” analysis is the assessaccess to affordable oral contraceptives because of the AMP cal- ment of the concepts of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveculation is akin to the situation in Yick Wo and distinguishable ness. A law is over-inclusive when it applies to some situations
from Feeney. In fiscal year 2006, the Medicaid program spent that do not serve its objectives.135 Conversely, a law is under$1.3 billion for family planning services, and Title X funds con- inclusive when it “does not apply to some situations that do serve
tributed $215 million to approximately 7,683 clinics.125 Each its objectives.”136 The DRA, although it contains no express
year, approximately seven million women received contracep- language regarding gender differentiation and denial of access
tive services.126 Of the total number of
to oral contraceptives, can be seen as overpatients treated, men accounted for only
inclusive because it affects all women procur5% of the overall caseload.127 Here, As a matter of public policy, ing oral contraceptives from federally funded or
Congressional intent points toward we, as a nation, want women campus health clinics, including those individuthe “evil eye and unequal hand” and to have affordable access to als not traditionally covered under the umbrella
of Title X or Medicaid. There is a strong likeli“purposeful discrimination” because
oral contraceptives.
hood that the classification will meet the appliCongress knew the DRA AMP formula
cable means test.
was being applied in a way that denied
As a matter of public policy, we, as a nation, want women
women access to oral contraceptives to which they were entitled
under federal programs.128 Congress also knew of executive ini- to have affordable access to oral contraceptives. As a plurality
tiatives to equate oral contraceptives to a surgical abortion.129 of the Supreme Court acknowledged 35 years ago, “our Nation
Therefore, the discrimination against women, public administra- has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”137
tion, and purpose and effect of the DRA should be violations of Public policy has been defined as “the principle of law which
equal protection.
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency
For purposes of the DRA, the classifying factor distin- to be injurious to the public or against the public good.”138 Preguishing between two similarly situated classes is gender, which venting access to oral contraceptives for the treatment of medireceives intermediate scrutiny. Men’s access to prescriptions cal conditions that inhibit women from being productive and
related to reproductive health has not been rendered inaccessible efficient citizens, for family planning purposes, which in turn
due to cost while women’s prescriptions for oral contraceptives decreases abortion rates and government costs, and for discouraghave been affected by the DRA.
ing healthy living at every stage of life are acts that are injurious
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to the public good.139 Therefore, as a matter of public policy, it is
imperative that access to oral contraceptives at pre-DRA prices
be reinstated.

B. Remedies
The Supreme Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
broadly construes a private federal right of action for damages
and injunctive relief to redress violations by state officials of
rights created by the United States Constitution as well as federal
statutes.140 For example, a reading of the Public Health Service
Act does not “reveal a precise or elaborate remedial scheme that
would be obfuscated by allowing enforcement through a § 1983
action.”141 Also, the statutory language and legislative history
indicate an intent to improve and expand all aspects of family
planning services by providing grants to public or nonprofit private entities or state health authorities.142 Therefore, the Court in
Planned Parenthood of Billings v. Montana concluded that the
Public Health Services Act created federally enforceable rights
in the plaintiffs and since no Congressional intent to preclude
private enforcement existed, § 1983 provided a cause of action to
remedy an alleged violation of the Act.143
Relying on Supreme Court decisions, a U.S. District
Court recently held in Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia v.
Horizon NJ Health that a hospital’s claims against an insurance
provider for deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 could proceed.144 The court noted that a symbiotic
relationship was present because approximately 50% of funding
received was federal and that the insurance company derived a
substantial benefit.145 Additionally, the doctrine of third party
standing and in turn associational standing was upheld because
“the hospital had alleged facts sufficient to establish the thirdparty standing of its doctors to bring their patients’ claims.”146
Similarly, the DRA, because it is read in pari materia
with Title X and Medicaid, creates federally enforceable rights
in women who utilize clinics that qualify for federal funding
and since no Congressional intent is presently precluding private enforcement, § 1983 should be applicable. As in Children’s
Hosp. of Philadelphia, a symbiotic relationship exists between
the government and the pharmaceutical companies because the

drug manufacturers derive a substantial benefit from the billions
of dollars the government expends annually on prescriptions.147
In addition, Congress knew of the denial of access to oral contraceptives and has not passed any legislation or enforced correct
application of the AMP formula.148
The pharmaceutical companies’ interpretations of Section 6001 of the DRA to no longer offer oral contraceptives to
federally funded and campus health clinics based on the AMP
formula is also possibly unconstitutional. Federal courts have
held that private corporations that contract with the government
may not be entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.149 The
Supreme Court, applying the nexus approach, held the appropriate inquiry is “whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.”150
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis is an instructive example of
the application of the inquiry.151 Focusing on the state’s involvement, the challenged action was the lodge’s racial discrimination against private guests.152 The Supreme Court emphasized
that a nexus would exist and state action would be present, if the
state had “fostered or encouraged” the allegedly unconstitutional
action.153 Applying this reasoning to the DRA and the “business
decisions” made by pharmaceutical companies, it could be found
that a “sufficiently close nexus” between the State, the pharmaceutical companies and the potentially challenged action exists
to impose liability on both the State and the private companies
under § 1983.

Conclusion
There is no comparable situation for men. Women’s
overall healthcare is at issue and this type of funding reduction
of medical treatment options promulgated by the DRA is constitutionally invalid. As shown, cutting funding for oral contraceptives has far reaching implications for women including the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which embodies the notion that
what is not good policy is also not good politics.
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1759–1769, (June 17, 1993).
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Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Sept. 2008, available at http://www.acog.org.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also S. Ferrero, M.D., V. Remorgida, M.D., Endometriosis – Images
in Clinical Medicine, New Eng. J. Med., 357 (Aug. 16, 2007) (showcasing
pictures of endometriotic nodules in the diaphragm and indicating a follow-up
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pain free one year post-operative).
24 Deficit Reduction Act § 6001(d)(2).
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www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control/birth-control-pill-4228.
htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2008) (indicating that family planning clinics often
charge less than private health care providers for an exam and for the pill).
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available at www.crowley.house.gov/news/record.asp?id=1076.
65 See Adam J. Fein, PhD, An AMP Timeline Appears, (June 19, 2007), available at http://www.drugchannels.net/ 2007/06/amp-timeline-appears.html, (last
visited Oct. 14, 2008) (discussing the short term and long term effects of the
changes related to AMP and the impact on the pharmacy supply chain).
66 The Pill, supra note 5.
67 Id.; see The Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97 (1965).
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69 Id. at § 1001(a); 42 U.S.C. § 300-300(a)-41 (1970).
70 Title X, § 1008; see also, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1667, p. 8.
71 See Pub. L. No. 94-63 (July 29, 1975), 42 U.S.C. 254(b) (1975) (amending
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Pub. L. 85-554 § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), provided
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symbiotic relationship with the government.”).
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http://www.healthlawyers.org.: see Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia,
No. 07-5061; Planned Parenthood of Billings, Inc. v. State of Mont., 648
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Jones v. Bennet : The Bifurcated Legal Status of
Early Nineteenth Century Free Blacks in Kentucky
By
Alexander J. Chenault*

I. Introduction

remained part of Virginia until officially gaining its statehood on
June 4, 1792.10 Many of the “old issue” free blacks (those freed
In 1829, Henry Clay, then President of the American
before the civil war) descended from Africans born during the
Colonization Society for the Free People of Color, pronounced:
colonial period in Virginia.11 Around 1786, William Chenault,
Sr. settled in Kentucky with his slaves after purchasing a tract
“Of all the descriptions of our population, and
of land located near the present site of the city of Richmond, in
of either portion of the African race, the free
Madison County. Chenault, Sr. died of the “cold plague” in the
people of color are, by far, as a class, the most
spring of 1813.12
corrupt, depraved and abandoned . . . . They are
William Chenault, Jr. was just thirteen when his parnot slaves, and yet they are not free. The laws,
ents
brought
him to Kentucky.13 He became influential in pubit is true, proclaim them free; but prejudices,
lic affairs, and in 1822 he served as a representative in the state
more powerful than any law, deny them the
1
legislature. William married Susanna Phelps, the daughter of
privileges of freemen.”
Josiah Phelps, another pioneer of Madison County, Kentucky.14
This pronouncement accurately describes the existence By 1802, Chenault was 27 years old. That same year, Levi Jones
of Levi Jones. Jones, a free man of color, was emancipated by his was born.15 According to the 1810 Census for Madison County,
master, William Chenault, on the 31st of May, 1830, in Madison Chenault was listed as having eight slaves.16
County, Kentucky.2 Jones’ family’s story, told
The African-American presthrough the case of Jones v. Bennet, sheds light
ence in early Kentucky was due primarThe African-American
on the struggles faced by free persons of color
ily to the transplant of Virginia’s model
in Kentucky. This struggle took place against
presence in early Kentucky of slavery into the “trans-Appalachian
the background of the first half of the 19th
West.”17 Kentucky had fewer slave laws
was due primarily to the
century before Lincoln signed the Emancipathan one might find in other slave states,
tion Proclamation, freeing millions of black transplant of Virginia’s model but the patterns were similar. The first
slaves.3 This paper will discuss the bifurConstitution of the State in 1792 proof slavery into the
cated status of early 19th century free blacks
“trans-Appalachian West.” vided that all the laws then in force in
in Kentucky, both as “free blacks” under the
the State of Virginia should be in force
eyes of the law and as second-class American
in Kentucky, with a few exceptions.
citizens.
“Similar to the laws of Virginia, Kentucky laws legally defined
On May 8, 1840, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky enslaved blacks as real estate, with no civil or human rights.”18
decided the case of Levi Jones versus John and Samuel Ben- Kentucky laws also promulgated the punishment for offenses
net.4 Levi Jones’ master, William Chenault, emancipated Jones committed by slaves; white legislators used the law to make
10 years earlier.5 Unfortunately, this colored man, husband, and sure that slaves could not travel freely, hoping thereby to curb
father of four would face a new burden with his new legal status. the number of runaway slaves. Furthermore, if a captain hired
The Jones family would find itself defending the family’s free- or allowed a slave to travel on board a ship without the permisdom on at least two occasions because of unpaid debts.6
sion of that slave’s owner, his ship could be seized and sold. The
law punished whites for selling liquor to blacks or assisting them
in travel. The law also punished enslaved blacks for conspiracy
II. 1801–1830: Property of
against whites or for resisting whites. Several statutes, however,
William Chenault
afforded slaves some religious standing, equal to some of the
benefits enjoyed by free blacks, and also enabled owners to tesWilliam Chenault, Jr. was a member of one of the oldest tify on a slave’s behalf.19
families in Kentucky. His father, William Chenault, Sr., served
Under these laws, some slaves preceded their owners
in the Revolutionary war under General George Washington.7 into the Kentucky frontier; clearing the land, building homes,
Chenault, Sr. was born in Albemarle, Virginia. Chenault was a roads, and other structures, and planting and harvesting crops.
descendant of Estienne Chenault, a French Huguenot who came Other slaves entered Kentucky with their masters and, once setto America with hundreds of others in 1701.8
tled, performed essentially the same domestic and agricultural
Before Chenault settled in Kentucky, and after the tasks.20 As the white population increased, the black population
Revolutionary War, the government issued soldiers land grants, increased proportionately. At the time of the first federal census
encouraging the rapid settlement of Kentucky following the war.9 in 1790, in Kentucky there were 11,944 African-Americans and
Kentucky became part of Virginia’s Fincastle County in 1772 and 114 of them were free people of color.21
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III. Manumission:
Pathway to Freedom

It was not uncommon for emancipated slaves to leave
Kentucky. Upon manumission, most southern states did not allow
freed slaves to reside within their borders. In 1691, Virginia
Manumission was a method whereby enslaved blacks enacted a law insisting that no Negro be set free unless the owner
could be emancipated. One of the earliest Kentucky statutes on paid for his transportation out of the colony.31 Similarly, starting
the issue passed in 1800, providing that the last will of any per- in 1851, a Kentucky master could free a slave, over sixty-five
son 18 years of age or older could emancipate slaves.22 Slaves years old or infirm, but only if he gave the freed slave the means
could also try to buy their own freedom. Kentucky’s economic for transportation out of Kentucky and enough money to support
system of small farms and small slave holdings encouraged a the freed slave for one year.32 During the same period, Louisiana
practice of slave leasing. This activity worked to the benefit of enacted a law requiring emancipated slaves to leave the country
slaves. Rental slaves, who were allowed to hire themselves out, within a year. The law required the owner to pay for the freed
might after a number of years save money and eventually buy slave’s trip to Africa and for his support upon arrival.33
Such statutes tended to discourage manumission.
their freedom.23
Just as early as slaves came to Kentucky, some were being Undoubtedly, had Levi and Sally Ann’s story taken place in the
manumitted. In 1782, even before Kentucky officially became a 1850’s, their manumission would have been unlikely because
state, an enslaved man named Monk Estill helped prevent the of the increased financial responsibilities placed on the owners.
destruction, by American Indians, of Estill’s Station, his owner’s Between 1830 and 1850, the number of free blacks in Kentucky
property. Monk attempted to find Captain James Estill to warn doubled, increasing from 4,917 to just over 10,000. According to
him of the attack, and found him near present day Mt. Sterling the Federal Census of 1860, however, the number of free blacks
stagnated, suggesting that few slaves were manujust as the ambush began. Though Capmitted after the laws were toughened in 1851.34
tain Estill was killed, Monk brought his
Regardless
of
his
age
or
While the date of Levi and Sally Ann’s
body back to the station. For his bravery, Captain Estill’s oldest son freed condition, a slave in Kentucky union is unknown, marriage between free blacks
would not become legal until 1825. Moreover,
Monk through a process of “manumiscould be manumitted
the law absolutely did not recognize marriages
sion.” Monk moved to Fort Boonesboro
provided that his or her
between free blacks and slaves. The progeny of
wherein he became a skilled maker of
master posted sufficient
such unions assumed the status of the mother. As
gunpowder and the father of the first
free African-American child to be born security that the slave would a result, many male slaves who achieved finansuccess by hiring themselves out purchased
in Kentucky.24
not become a public charge. cial
the freedom of their wives first, preventing their
In 1830, William Chenault’s
children being born into slavery.35 Even if one
cousin, John Bennet,25 liberated a
female slave named Sally Ann, the wife of Levi Jones and the had the means to do so, free persons of color could not purchase
mother of their four children.26 Bennet was at some point a slave the freedom of their friends or extended family. The law provided
owner but seemed to have been opposed to slavery in principle. that “[n]o free negro was capable of acquiring in fee, or holding
Regardless of his age or condition, a slave in Kentucky could for any length of time, any slave other than the husband, parent
be manumitted provided that his or her master posted sufficient or descendant of such free negro.” 36
The fact that free black owners, such as Jones, did not
security that the slave would not become a public charge. From
1794 to 1842 this posting of security was optional. Thereafter, always emancipate their purchased relatives also proved proband up until 1851, the posting of sufficient security was mandato- lematic. Most free blacks purchased their slave relatives with the
ry.27 The omission of the bond provision after 1851 can be traced intent of emancipating them, but the threat of re-enslavement
to the requirement that the ex-slaves leave the state. Other states was possible.37 Few free men could afford to post the sometimessuch as Virginia had a certain period within which ex-slaves must required bonds to ensure that newly freed slaves would not
become wards of the county.38 The possible fines for free blacks
leave; Kentucky did not specify such a time period. 28
The large number of slaves in Kentucky and the decreas- were plentiful; the homes of free families were often subject to
ing profits of slavery might have encouraged the practice of man- raids by patrolmen searching for enslaved blacks illegally visitumission. As the economic demands for more slaves increased ing their friends and family.39 Fines were imposed for violators,
in southern states, both Kentucky and Virginia’s slave markets such as having his or her slaves seized and sold for those slave
responded to the cotton belt’s demands. In 1840, Robert Wick- owners who fell into debt.40
liffe, the largest slave owner in Fayette County, Kentucky, bragged
to the Kentucky Legislature that up to 6,000 slaves per year were
being sold to southern states from Kentucky.29 Wickliffe’s manuIV: The Not So Pretty Existence of Free
mission of some of his slaves, sending them to Liberia, evinces
Blacks in Kentucky
the popularity of the practice. In a letter sent from Liberia, an
octoroon woman, Milly—once owned by Wickliffe and who gave
“The liberty of colored free men has not been
birth to a baby sired by Wickliffe’s stepson—wrote a long letter
sufficiently guarded by the laws of the United
thanking her former owners for their benevolence. Milly arrived
States, nor any of the separate states.” 41
in Liberia on July 11, 1833, along with 145 other new settlers.
According to the ship records, 119 of the passengers were from
Around the date of Levi’s manumission, Bennet, who
Kentucky: 16 born free, the rest manumitted.30
was about to move to Missouri, entered into an agreement with
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Levi Jones to sell him his own children for 300 dollars, payable entitled to relief. In regards to the jurisdiction argument, the court
in three annual installments, with legal interest from the date of reasoned that:
the contract.42 The contract however, was not committed to writA court of equity has jurisdiction to enforce a
ing until sometime after the date of the verbal agreement and the
43
contract for movable property, or to coerce its
delivery of the children to Jones.
restoration to its rightful owner, from whom
When John Bennet returned to Kentucky in the autumn
it has been taken, whenever the property is of
of 1831, Levi was unable to pay the first installment for the pur44
such a peculiar character that the recovery of
chase of his children. His financial difficulties were not unique.
damages, in lieu of the specific thing, would be
Because free blacks competed with slaves and white labor, their
but an inadequate or inappropriate remedy . . . .
wages were less than they might otherwise have been. On the
And there can be no stronger case of that class,
other hand, some freemen prospered, holding themselves out as
45
than where a parent brings a bill to coerce the
ministers, teachers, barbers and tailors.
restoration of a child that has been abducted
Almost a year later, in May of 1832, Bennet’s son,
from him, and is held in slavery.56
Samuel, who still lived in Kentucky, procured from his father a
document purporting to be a bill of sale for the four children for
the sum of three hundred and thirty-six dollars—the sum then
The Court found that “the abduction and detention of the
due from Jones according to the terms of the contract.46 Shortly children by Samuel Bennet, were unauthorized and tortious.” 57
thereafter, Samuel Bennet abducted
The Court further held that Samuel Bennet
Levi’s three oldest children and detained
should “be compelled to pay damages for the
Free people of color in
them as slaves without Levi’s consent.47
wrongful detention, and make restitution of
Kentucky constantly feared the children, upon receiving the price which
Free people of color in Kentucky
constantly feared kidnapping. Although
his father would have been entitled to receive
kidnapping.
the state had enacted anti-kidnapping
from Levi, and the accruing interest thereon
laws, they were scarcely enforced and
from the date of the contract in 1830.” 58 The
thus of little use. Kidnapping cases were difficult to prosecute Court declared: “One who has taken away and detained wrongbecause they often involved interstate travel.48 Though sell- fully the children of a colored man, is liable [to] him, for daming free blacks into slavery became a crime after 1801, it was ages equal to the value of their hire.” 59
rumored that the practice continued throughout the antebellum
The Jones family’s peace was short lived. In 1845, just
period. As Marion B. Lucas explains, “corrupt patrollers” sold five years after the chancery held that Levi was entitled to the
freemen to slave traders who took a policy of asking no questions return of his family, two of his children, Betsy, 23, and Emily, 19,
about the status of the “slaves.” 49 Particularly, free blacks who along with Betsy’s two children, Spicy and Edmund, were in the
worked along the lower Mississippi were intimidated and forced Woodford Circuit Chancery Circuit Court suing again for their
into slavery.50
freedom.60 A 1789 Kentucky statute allowed Jones to bring suit
Levi instituted his case not in a criminal court, but rather before the court providing that enslaved blacks should receive the
in chancery, a court authorized to apply principles of equity as same judgment and stand in the same condition with respect to
opposed to law. In 1836, Levi filed a bill in Chancery against the benefit of clergy as free blacks or mulattoes.61 According to
John and Samuel Bennet. He prayed for a decree upon equitable the petition, they asserted that Jones purchased Emily and Betsy
terms, which would return his children to him as restitution.
“upon the express consideration that said Emily and Betsy were
In court, free blacks operated from an inferior position to be free whenever they should attain the age of twenty-one
to their white counterparts. Freemen did possess some important years as likewise all their children born before that time.” 62
rights such as the right to trial by jury, the right to challenge jury
Unfortunately, Levi Jones’ children had been levied upon
selections, and the right to offer evidence in their own behalf.51 for debts and were about to be sold back into slavery to either
In capital cases, however, free blacks could not testify against Robert Adams or Benjamin Bailey to satisfy the judgments. They
whites.52 These limitations did not intimidate Jones. He went full prayed to the chancery court for an injunction and a declaration
force ahead, “averring that he had offered, and was still willing of freedom.63 The outcome of this prayer is unknown. Accordto pay the full amount of the conventional price.” 53 Defendant ing to the 1850 Census, Emily and Betsy were living with their
John Bennet never answered the bill. His son Samuel resisted any mother and father. In fact, Levi had managed to purchase more
decree for relief, insisting that the Chancellor—the judge of the relatives. The records list a 73-year-old, Anny, residing with the
Chancery—had no jurisdiction.54 He also alleged that:
Jones household.64 Levi, who was then 48, worked as a farmer in
Versailles but owned no land.65 The desire to purchase more of
the terms of the contract of sale to Levi, authohis relatives and the cost associated with doing so had put a strain
rized John Bennet to vacate the sale, in the
on his ability to acquire property.
event of a failure by Levi to make punctual
Free blacks in Kentucky walked a thin line between livpayment of any one of the annual installments
ing as freemen and living in bondage. Freemen always had to
of the consideration; and which, as he averred,
be prepared to prove their legal status; they had to walk with
. . . John Bennet had done by selling the chiltheir “free papers” or face jail time.66 They lacked the right of
dren to Samuel for 336 dollars.55
privacy; “watchmen” could enter their homes at anytime without
a warrant.67 Moreover, if a free black was found to be loitering
The Chief Justice from the Circuit Court for Madison
or “misbehaving,” they could be captured and hired out for up to
County thought otherwise. He was of the opinion that Levi was
34
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three months per instance.68 The rationale behind the policy was
that the sight of free blacks encouraged slaves to seek their own
freedom.69
Free black children could also be bound out as apprentices if their parents were found to have no visible employment.
Although when the Kentucky legislature enacted this law children bonded out had to be provided education, by 1843 the legislature had removed the requirement.70 Transportation in and out
of Kentucky was heavily restricted. In 1818, a state law forbade
the migration of free blacks from other states into Kentucky.71
Railroads frequently refused free blacks passage even with their
“free papers.” 72

V. Anti-Slavery Pressure from the
Baptist Church
Undoubtedly, slave owners were motivated by a variety of
factors—financial, religious, sentimental, moral and ethical—to
free slaves. Baptists in Virginia expressed opposition to slavery
as early as 1787.73 This may have influenced Chenault, who was
a Baptist from Virginia, to free Jones. A number of the members of Baptist churches, acting independently of the churches,
organized an anti-slavery society called the Kentucky Abolition
Society.74 Baptists and slaveholders hotly contested slavery in the
Baptist church with emancipating Baptists consistently refusing
to commune with slaveholders.75 It is quite possible that William
was at least influenced by the anti-slavery movement in the Baptist church.
Between 1829 and 1859, the Kentucky Colonization
Society for Free People of Color helped 658 free blacks leave
the state and settle in Liberia.76 Kentucky’s public opposition to

slavery was carried out primarily through the work of the Kentucky Abolition Society and the Kentucky Colonization Society,
the latter a branch of the National American Colonization Society. Founded in 1808, the Kentucky Abolition Society defined
African slavery as “a system of oppression pregnant with moral,
national and domestic evils, ruinous to national tranquility, honor
and enjoyment.” 77 The Kentucky Abolition organized local antislavery societies in Kentucky. Eight local societies were reported
by 1827.78
“The colonization movement enabled influential slaveholding politicians like Henry Clay to favor sending free blacks
and manumitted slaves back to Africa, while allowing them to
also distance themselves from supporting the principle of immediate abolition.” 79 In addition to helping free blacks leave the
country, abolition societies defended free blacks before the law
and advocated to “ameliorate the condition of the slaves and to
prevent the separation of families.” 80

VI. Conclusion
In Kentucky, when the state revised its constitution in
1799, free blacks further lost rights. They were “discriminated
against and excluded from enjoying key citizenship rights,
including being prohibited from voting, holding public office,
and serving in the militia and from bearing arms.” 81 The Jones
family, suffering from many of these prejudices pronounced by
Clay and by the State Constitution, did not leave the country or
even their small town. While the Jones family could have fled
to the North and its more lenient laws for free people of color,
they stood their ground, fought back, and made the best of their
complicated existence.
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Robust Exchange of Ideas and the Presence of the
African American Voice in the Law School Environment:
A Review of Literature
By
Artika Tyner, Esq.*
People of color represent about 30% of the United States Donald Murray. Simultaneously, “Blacks only” law schools were
population, but less than 10% of lawyers.1 African-Americans created to offer alternative opportunities for African-American
represent approximately 13% of the United States population, applicants.9
but only 6.8% of enrolled law students.2 The rate of admission
One such example was the establishment of Howard
of African-Americans to law schools has experienced a continual Law School.10 The training at Howard Law School focused on
decline, diminishing the racial diversity of the law student body effectuating social change by dismantling racial segregation and
and the legal profession.3
defeating Jim Crow laws. For instance, on January 26, 1947,
The primary purpose of this literature review is to explore civil rights leaders met to brainstorm ideas and strategically plan
the research related to the enrollment of African-American stu- for ending racially restrictive covenants. Those in attendance
dents in law school, the effects of low enrollincluded Howard alumni who had become
ment on law school culture, and the evidence
civil rights pioneers, like William Hastie,
The rate of admission of
of successful initiatives that have increased
Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood RobinAfrican-Americans to law son, and James Nabrit. Howard alumnus
the number of African-Americans admitted
to law school. The search strategy explored
schools has experienced a Justice Thurgood Marshall also served as
the following key search terms: racism, law
counsel of the landmark court case Brown
school, law-study and teaching, law social continual decline, diminishing v. Board of Education, which overturned
the racial diversity of the
aspects and African-American law students.
Plessy v. Ferguson by holding that sepaThe search yielded 23 articles, 1 newspaper
rate educational facilities are inherently
law student body and the
article and 1 book.
unequal.11
legal profession.
In the first section, I describe the
Although admission to law school
historical and current statistics related to
is no longer limited by the “separate but
low enrollment and I provide research related to the underlying equal” doctrine, these historical barriers have had a lingering
reasons for the past and current enrollment trends. In the sec- effect.12 Presently, there are still a relatively low number of Afriond section, I examine the impact of low enrollment on the law can-Americans admitted into law school and practicing law.13 In
school environment and classroom dynamics. The final section recent years there has been a decline in the rate of enrollment
provides a summary of methods used to increase the enrollment of African-American law school applicants, down 8.6% since
of African-Americans in law school, focusing specifically on 1992.14 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Commission on
replenishing the pipeline of competitive applicants and removing Racial and Ethnic Diversity has found that advances for people
barriers in the law school admission process.
of color in the legal profession have stalled.15 The 2000 ABAsponsored Miles to Go report illustrates that there is still progress to be made. The report notes: “The legal profession—already
one
of the least integrated professions in the country—threatens
Historical Rates of African-American
to
become
even less representative of the citizens and society it
Enrollment in Law Schools
serves.”16
Segregationist policies in legal education were enforced
Law schools have voluntarily used affirmative action inifrom 1896 to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 tiatives to address the declining enrollment of people of color and
These policies created a barrier for African-Americans who promote racial diversity.17 Justice Marshall in Bakke v. Regents
sought to pursue a law degree and enter the legal profession.5 of University of California,18 expressed the importance of using
Law schools were impacted by the doctrine of “separate but race as a consideration in admission due to the historical barriers
equal” that was adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which required that restricted African-Americans from pursuing opportunities in
separate White and Colored race designations in public institu- higher education. Justice Marshall referred to affirmative action
tions and accommodations, including law schools. This doctrine plans as a method of remedying over 200 years in which the
directly impacted the enrollment opportunities available for Afri- Constitution did not prohibit the most “ingenious and pervasive”
can-Americans to enter law school and later practice law. In order forms of racial discrimination.19 The University of Michigan Law
to create access to the legal profession, litigation was necessary.7 School has used race as a plus factor in its admission process to
For example, in the case of Murray v. University of Maryland,8 the promote racial diversity. In Grutter v. Bollinger,20 the University
State of Maryland was not able to provide a “separate but equal” of Michigan Law School’s practice passed muster of the Fourlaw school for African-Americans. As a result of subsequent liti- teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. The Court held that
gation, they were required to admit an African-American male, the plan was narrowly tailored to derive the educational benefits
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of diversity.21 These educational benefits included the creation of
a multicultural environment.

Impacts of Low Enrollment on
Law School Cultures

Methods for Increasing the Enrollment of
African-Americans
The absence of a racially diverse student body in law
schools across the nation has diminished the possibility of obtain
ing the benefits derived from a diversity of opinion in the classroom and collaboration outside of the classroom.34 Researchers
have attributed this decline to the dwindling pipeline of AfricanAmerican students interested in pursuing a law degree35 and
barriers in the law school admission process, specifically Law
School Admission Test (“LSAT”) performance percentiles and
U.S. News and World Report rankings.36

In Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that diversity of the law student body is essential to
create the most “robust exchange of ideas.” 22 Many benefits will
be derived through this “robust exchange of ideas,” including:
promoting cross cultural understanding, helping breakdown
racial stereotypes, and enabling students to better understand
different races. In order to reap the many benefits derived from
racial diversity, law schools must admit a “critical mass” of
Pipeline of Future Law School Applicants
qualified applicants of color, including a representation of AfriDue to the historical barriers to higher education that
can-American law students. Grutter v. Bollinger followed the
precedent set forth in McLaurin v. University of Oklahoma Board flowed from Plessy v. Ferguson, there is a need to implement
of Regents, in which the Supreme Court held that the lack of measures that provide a large number of African-American students with quality education to compete in
exchanges across racial lines impairs
higher education opportunities, such as law
the ability of diverse students to engage
. . . the United States
school.37 Despite the promise of equal opportuin discussions, exchange ideas, develop
Supreme Court recognized nity embodied in Brown v. Board of Education,
as a professional, and gain leadership
a disproportionate number of African-American
skills.23
that diversity of the law
children today attend rural and under-funded
Racial diversity is an imporstudent body is essential
schools that are predominantly Black and
tant factor for reaching the mission
to create the most “robust unequal to their suburban counterparts.38 Jusof higher education. As a result, it is
tice Thurgood Marshall highlighted in Bakke v.
necessary to bring students of diverse
exchange of ideas.”
Regents of University of California, the need to
ideas, backgrounds and experiences
be intentional in promoting racial diversity by
together.24 The inclusion of law students from different racial backgrounds creates a healthy debate creating a racial class-based remedy to address America’s history
derived from diverse opinions; the absence of diversity creates of discrimination against African-Americans.39
Class-based discrimination is evidenced by the unequal
a void in the learning environment and a correlating void in the
legal profession.25 In addition to the “robust exchange of ideas,” opportunities in primary and secondary schooling that have placed
there is also a need for diversity in perspectives and life experi- applicants of color at an academic disadvantage.40 Research in
ences to prevent feelings of isolation and alienation experienced career choice and counseling psychology demonstrates that in
by students when they are separated from a “critical mass” of order to encourage young people to pursue a particular career,
they must be provided with the following opportunities: “career
others that share their same racial heritage.26
Law schools have a mandate to ensure racial diversity pathway education, career role models, social support and perin the classroom.27 The ABA standards on equal opportunity and suasion, and a chance to experience and enjoy career-related
diversity require law schools to take “concrete action” to grant tasks.” 41
full opportunities for the study of law and professional opportunities to practice law to members of underrepresented populations, like African-Americans.28
Successful Pipeline Initiatives
The benefits derived from diversity move beyond the
A partnership has been established between the National
classroom to the society as a whole since low enrollment of
African-American law students leaves fewer attorneys of color in Association for Legal Career Professionals (“NALP”) and Street
America’s history and less diversity on the bench and in the legal Law Incorporated to offer career development opportunities to
bar.29 Achieving diversity is important for ensuring the “survival low-income school children.42 This program will pair NALP
of our justice system, which is the connecting link between the sponsored law firms with local high schools. Practicing attorneys
rule of law and society,” according to 2000 ABA President Wil- will teach law-related topics at high schools, including substanliam G. Paul.30 Diversity in the law school student body will also tive areas of the law, the legal profession, and legal career paths.
alter the perception that the legal profession is not responsive to Street Law Inc.’s three decades of experience in academic trainthe needs of diverse populations.31 Former Detroit Mayor Dennis ing helps it provide ongoing support to participating law firms
W. Archer stated that “[t]he strength of the justice system and our and high schools. Street Law Inc.’s efforts in improving diverprofession depends on the level of respect that people have for sity have focused on increasing the number of young people who
it.” 32 The lack of racial diversity threatens the future of the jus- express an interest in legal careers.
Advocates committed to replenishing the pipeline of
tice system because racial equality cannot be reached until access
African-American applicants strongly support mentorship pro
to legal education is made available to all members of society.33
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gramming.43 Mentorship offers the guidance needed to aid youth failed because law school admission and accreditation practices
in career development.44 These efforts should begin in elemen- have in effect created a system of de facto racial segregation in
tary schools, focusing on fourth and fifth grades, while students America’s law schools.59 The majority of law schools use the
have time to explore long-term career goals and see the prac- LSAT scores as a factor in determining admission eligibility. The
tice of law as a realistic possibility.45 One such opportunity can LSAT/UGPA index demonstrates a measure of cognitive ability
be found in serving as a mock trial coach. Monte Squire sug- but only predicts about 25% of a law student’s success during the
gests that mentorship can help to prepare the next generation of first year.60
lawyers.46 Squire’s work includes mentoring students at Howard
African-American students tend to score lower on the
High School and coaching their mock trial team. As a result of LSAT than the national average.61 The average LSAT scores for
Squire’s involvement, students have expressed increased self- African-Americans are 143–144,62 while the national average
confidence as well as interest in legal careers.47 Twelfth grader is 150.63 Okechukwu Oko argues that this poor academic perTerrance Potter is determined to become an attorney: “I want to formance is not reflective of an innate lack of academic skills,
be an attorney because I have an interest in the political and legal but is caused by factors such as racial and socioeconomic barprocess.” 48 Gursimrat “Simmy” Kaur gained valuable skills to riers.64 Oko attributes poor performance on the LSAT to poor
prepare for his future in higher education through Squire’s men- academic training, lack of mentorship, and limited access to
toring. Simmy said “[Mock trial] challenges
financial resources.65 Low scores serve as a
me academically and hones my group interbar to admission. When law schools receive
A more holistic,
action skills, which are skills that I may need
pressure from ABA accreditors to limit the
individualized approach number of applicants with LSAT scores less
in college.” 49
It is important to have lawyers and
to the admission process than 141,66 this limits the number of Afri50
students of color involved as mentors.
can-Americans that will enter law school.
would be to provide
Young students can then see themselves in
A more holistic, individualized
an in-depth analysis
the mentors’ images and adopt higher goals
approach to the admission process would
of academic success.51 Maya Harris, Execube to provide an in-depth analysis of each
of each applicant’s
tive Director of the American Civil Liberties
applicant’s qualifications.67 By applying
qualifications.
Union of Northern California, is devoted to
this approach, Louisiana State University
mentoring students and describes her comhas made strides in increasing Africanmitment as a “responsibility.” 52 She acknowledges that others American law student enrollment.68 Studies have shown that there
opened doors for her and she challenges attorneys of color to are a number of alternative assessment measures of academic
open the door wider for future generations. Community involve- success in law school beside the LSAT: emotional intelligence
ment is an integral part of helping students to explore career (determining how a person can regulate, manage and perceive
options. Replenishing the pipeline requires a collective effort of emotions), accomplishment record history (highlighting achievethe African-American community in encouraging African-Amer- ments in strategic planning, problem solving and research),
ican students to pursue a career in the legal profession.53
situational judgment (evaluating one’s decision making skills),
and moral responsibility (examining the evolution of one’s
moral development).69 The use of alternative cognitive assessment tools has decreased the difference in performance results
Financing a Legal Education
between African-American and White-American students. Dr.
Socioeconomic barriers limit access to law school for Zedeck has used a variety of measures to test cognitive ability:
African-American students.54 Law school is a substantial invest- instead of giving exams administered through traditional paper
ment of at least $100,000; the average amount of law school debt and pencil methods, he has used videotape demonstrations and
is $85,000.55 Some initiatives have been successful in making law then asked test participants to respond to the video.70 Through
school accessible by providing financial support. For example, this method, he was able to reduce the performance gap between
Seattle University admits 30 diverse students that demonstrate African-Americans and White-Americans by half of a standard
an “indicia of success” and offers financial and academic support deviation.71
for each.56 At a national level, the 2000 ABA President William
Universities have also tried alternative methods that
G. Paul raised $1.3 million in less than a year to offer scholarship offer a more individualized selection process without taking into
funds to students of color in need.57 These efforts address the account LSAT scoring. The University of Michigan has created a
financial challenges experienced by African-American students new special admissions program called the “Wolverine Scholars
as they seek to finance a legal education.
Program.” This program will not consider LSAT scores.72 Admission will be determined instead by a student’s grade point average, leadership experience, community service, and resilience in
dealing with adversity.
Barriers in Law School Admission
LSAT scores also influence national law school rankThe decline of African-American law student enroll- ings for the U.S. News and World Report.73 This ranking system
ment has been attributed to the over-reliance on standardized does not measure a law school’s ability to reach the most “robust
tests and influence of national rankings.58 According to Nuss- exchange of ideas;” instead the rankings focus on numerical data,
baumer, efforts during the past ten years to further diversity like the LSAT. This influences the admission selections of law
by enrolling more African-American law school students have schools as they strive to build a national reputation.74
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pipeline of qualified African-American law school applicants.75
Researchers have also found barriers in the admission process due
This literature review explored the research related to to LSAT scores and U.S. News World and Report rankings.76
the enrollment of African-American students in law school, the
The literature available does not adequately address
effects of low enrollment on the law school culture, and evi- attrition rates. The literature challenges the validity of LSAT
dence of successful initiatives that have increased the number of scores being a measure of future academic success but fails to
African-Americans admitted to law school. The literature review offer data that either approves or disapproves this premise. There
began by examining the historical barriers of racial segregation is still a need for studies that explore the role of the LSAT in prein law schools which led to the birth of affirdicting academic performance, bar pasmative action and emphasis on racial diversage, and ability to practice law. I would
sity. The key case in this analysis, Grutter v. “How do law schools increase recommend additional research in these
the presence of the
Bollinger, created precedent by allowing law
areas. The students recently admitted to
schools to use race as a plus factor during
the University of Michigan without taking
African-American voice
the admission process analysis. The underlythe LSAT would make an ideal research
ing goal of Grutter v. Bollinger was to create in the law school environment sample. Researchers should monitor their
to create the most ‘robust performance from their first year at school
the most “robust exchange of ideas” through
the inclusion of voices from various different
through their bar passage.
exchange of ideas?”
racial backgrounds. Despite these efforts, the
In closing, the United States
matriculation of African-American law stuSupreme Court’s vision of creating a most
dents has continued to remain comparatively low.
“robust exchange of ideas” is an inspirational goal that should
The question then becomes: “How do law schools become a reality. The law school culture would benefit immensely
increase the presence of the African-American voice in the law from an environment where students of various different racial
school environment to create the most ‘robust exchange of ideas?” heritages can gather together to discuss the nation’s most chalResearchers assert that law schools and attorneys alike must lenging issues and use their analytical and critical-thinking skills
make a concerted effort to increase racial diversity by creating a to address them.
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This Game Is Rigged: The Unequal Protection of Our
Mentally-Ill Incarcerated Women
By
Joanna E. Saul*

Introduction

This paper will examine recent inmate equal protection
cases and will argue that Flynn and similar plaintiffs nationwide
More mentally-ill women fill our jails and prisons every stand little chance of success, given the impossible standard
day.1 Within the past few years, the number of women entering established by the federal appellate courts that defeats any equal
our state prisons has increased at almost twice the rate of men.2 protection claim brought by female inmates. Part I will introduce
Even more astonishing is that 73% of these women in state pris- the problem of inadequate mental health treatment for female
ons have a mental health problem, in striking contrast to only inmates, including the current level of illness in the female popu55% of male state inmates.3 Both male and female inmates are lation entering prison, and the gender-based differences in care
equally dependent on the state to provide mental health treatment that the women receive. Part II will examine the Equal Protecand both have an equal right to care under the
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Constitution.4 However, women often receive
in relation to the American correctional
. . . the courts have granted system. It will compare the most recent
mental health services inferior in quality and
quantity to those received by men.
Equal Protection cases brought by prison
“substantial deference”
If denied treatment, female inmates
inmates to the seminal case of United
to prison authorities and
may have to resort to the courts. In 2005, sevStates v. Virginia, involving female colhave perpetuated gender
eral female inmates at the Taycheedah Corlege students. This section will also advorectional Institution in Wisconsin filed Flynn
cate for a similar application of the law
discrimination.
v. Doyle5 with the assistance of the Wisconsin
to the claims of female inmates. Part III
ACLU on behalf of all women incarcerated in
will conclude that courts need to create
Taycheedah. The lead plaintiff, Kristine Flynn, is a 48 year old a workable standard that ensures the constitutional equal protecwoman who suffers from bipolar mood disorder and social anxi- tion rights of female inmates.
ety syndrome.6 She is considered seriously mentally-ill by the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections.7 According to the complaint, Flynn was prescribed eight different psychotropic mediI. The Inadequate Treatment of Mentally-Ill
cations within one year, taking some of them simultaneously.8
Women Prisoners
Yet she only had her blood drawn once to test her liver function
during that year.9 In 2002, prison staff ordered her to be immediMental illness is a serious problem for the majority of
ately taken off of all medications.10 Flynn attempted suicide six America’s female inmate population. Inadequate mental health
days later.11 After being taken to the hospital, she took one person resources for female inmates affect more than just the residents
hostage and assaulted a security guard.12 The court-appointed within the prison walls: most inmates eventually leave the prison
psychiatrist testified that her behavior was due to the interruption and return to the community from which they came.20 The folin her medication, yet an entire month passed after the assault lowing sections examine first the prevalence of mental health illbefore she was remedicated.13 Four years were added to her sen- nesses among female inmates; second, gender-based differences
tence, she was housed in segregation, and she still did not receive in mental health treatment in prisons; and third, the constitutional
her medication.14 Flynn was unable to eat, sleep, or take care right of inmates to adequate mental health treatment.
of her basic needs during this period15 and she attempted suicide again.16 She did not receive any group or individual therapy,
A. The Mental Illness of America’s Prison
despite having requested counseling several times.17 This case is
Population
still pending in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin.
Flynn is representative not only of women in the WisThe mental health of America’s inmates is in a crisis:
consin correctional system, but of mentally-ill women in cor- 73% of women in state prisons have a mental health problem.21
rectional institutions across the nation who receive inadequate The cause of this crisis is clear: as public mental hospitals have
and ultimately harmful treatment. Imprisoned litigants, such as emptied due to cost and other pressures, the mentally-ill, who
Flynn, will have to battle separately in each state for their mental rightfully should be treated in a hospital setting, have entered
health needs. And indeed, if the prison system ignores their needs, our prison systems.22 From 1955 to 2000, the number of patients
courts may be the best recourse. According to the Supreme Court, housed in state mental hospitals dropped from almost 560,000
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental to about 56,000.23 Between 2000 and 2003, the average number
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty of residents in state- and county-run mental hospitals was less
to protect constitutional rights.”18 Yet this promise may be mere than 50,000.24 Similarly, the lengths of stays in private psychiattalk: in reality, the courts have granted “substantial deference” to ric hospitals dropped from twenty-one days per episode in 1980
prison authorities19 and have perpetuated gender discrimination. to five or six days in 2004.25 Conversely, the adult population in
42
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under correctional supervision grew from 1,842,100 in 1980 to mentally-ill.40 In comparison, in a 2006 study, when others within
7,211,400 in 2006.26 According to a recent Bureau of Justice Sta- the prison were surveyed regarding symptoms demonstrated by
tistics’ estimation, 705,600 inmates in state prisons had a mental the inmate population, 73% of the female state inmate population
health problem at midyear 2005.27 Assuming these numbers are were identified as mentally-ill.41 Clearly, better screening tools
correct, there are currently fourteen times as many mentally-ill need to be developed and used.
persons housed in our correctional facilities
Even when women are successas in our state mental hospitals. Women in
fully identified by a screening instrument,
Under the Eighth
particular are afflicted, as a greater percentmen have better access to medical serage of female inmates are reported to have
vices42 by virtue of their larger populaAmendment,
prisons
are
28
a mental health problem, while there is
tion. Many treatment programs have been
constitutionally required
lesser availability of treatment.
designed with men in mind43 and have not
to
provide
medical
In addition to their basic mental
taken into account the unique needs of the
health needs, inmates with mental health
female population.44 In addition, several
health care for inmates.
problems also have a higher probability of
state prison systems have facilities desigsubstance abuse29 and self-harm, includnated solely for use as a psychiatric hospital
ing suicide.30 Drug abuse has serious public health implications, for men, but have no corresponding facilities for women.45 This
including the increased risk of disease transmission, such as HIV/ is a primary basis for complaint in Flynn v. Doyle: in Wisconsin,
AIDS, as well as the risk of injury to any children the women only men have access to a facility providing round-the-clock care
may be carrying. A strong correlation exists between severe men- and individualized treatment.46 The prisons justify gender sepatal disorders and suicidal inclinations31—suicide is therefore a rations in prison based on security reasons and limited finances.
substantial concern with any mentally-ill incarcerated popula- However, under the Equal Protection Clause, women should not
tion and particularly with female inmates.32 Common methods be denied the same level of care available to men simply based
of suicide attempts by inmates include hanging, overdose, lac- on their gender.
eration, asphyxiation, and ingestion of toxic substances such as
shampoo.33
C. The Constitutional Requirement for Mental
Female inmates across America are afflicted with menHealth Treatment in Prison
tal health problems that require attention. Without effective
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisons are constitutiontreatment, these women return to the community with the same
ally
required
to provide medical health care for inmates.47 The
illnesses, if not made worse due to the length of time without
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted this obligation as inclutreatment.
sive of mental health care.48 According to the Fourth Circuit,

B. Gender Bias in the Provision of Mental Health
Services in Prison
Gender bias in prison has resulted in both over-diagnosis
and under-diagnosis of mental illness. Historically, prison staff
have used medication to sedate inmates and control disruptive
behavior.34 Criminal women in particular have been “treated”
because they exhibited “male” characteristics such as anger or
aggression that did not fit the societal mold of the docile homemaker.35 Conversely, female mentally-ill inmates often suffer
from inadequate treatment because they are not correctly identified as mentally-ill or because the prison does not have the
resources to treat them.36 Prisons that do not have the necessary
resources frequently house the mentally-ill in disciplinary segregation, limiting the inmates’ access to programming or social
interaction.37
A primary obstacle to the adequate treatment of men
tally-ill female inmates is the lack of a national validated instrument for mental health screening for adult prison.38 Each state
has come up with its own system, with varying success. In general, prisons’ tools for screening inmates with mental illnesses are
faulty.39 Without a standardized, reliable system, prison staff are
subject to the gender stereotypes that have been shown to affect
treatment choices and they are more likely to overlook inmates
who do need treatment. The inmates themselves may not know
that they have a problem and therefore may not bring themselves
to the attention of a mental health professional. For example, in
a Bureau of Justice Statistics’ study in 1999, only 24% of women
in state prison and local jails evaluated themselves as being
Spring 2009

[an inmate] is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health
care provider, exercising ordinary skill and
care at the time of observation, concludes with
reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or
injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3)
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by
reason of delay or the denial of care would be
substantial.49
The numerous phrases open to interpretation in the above standard render it useless for practical guidance to prison officials.50
Thus, several district courts have provided more definite guideposts by which to judge a prison health care system:
The six components are: (1) a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates to
identify those in need of mental health care; (2)
a treatment program that involves more than
segregation and close supervision of mentally
ill inmates; (3) employment of a sufficient
number of trained mental health professionals; (4) maintenance of accurate, complete, and
confidential mental health treatment records;
(5) administration of psychotropic medication
only with appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation; and (6) a basic program to
43

identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for
suicide.51
While this standard provides more definite boundaries for a
prison healthcare program, it has not been affirmed by a higher
court.52 Ultimately, female inmates’ constitutional right to and
need for adequate mental health care is not being met.

II. The Unequal Protection of
Female Inmates
Female inmates wishing to sue prisons based on their
inadequate treatment will find that the federal courts have narrowed prison-based equal protection law such that it is nearly
impossible for female inmates to succeed. The courts have established two barriers to a successful action: (1) splitting hairs over
what constitutes “similarly situated” inmate groups and (2) deference to prison finances.

A. The Courts’ Discriminatory Application of
Equal Protection Law
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat similarly situated people
alike.53 It prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender by state actors.54 Under this standard, discriminatory
classification or treatment between men and women is subject to
heightened scrutiny.55 For a gender-based classification to withstand the heightened standard of scrutiny, it must “serve important governmental objectives,” and “the discriminatory means
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.” 56 To succeed on an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must pass a threshold showing that she is similarly situated to others who received more favorable treatment.57 The next
sections will examine the recent history of equal protection jurisprudence, providing an in-depth look at the courts’ reasoning.

1. Equal Protection of Female Inmates
Flynn’s biggest challenge in the Equal Protection arena
is finding a “similarly situated” group to satisfy the courts. “Similarly situated” has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court:
the two groups do not have to be alike in every aspect.58 In fact,
in City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living Center, the Supreme
Court said that even though the group home for the mentally disabled, which was denied a permit by the city, was different from
other facilities that were permitted permits, the main question
was whether the proposed group home would affect the legitimate governmental interests in a way that the permitted uses did
not.59 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,60 a case involving students of different ages and
races, and schools of different sizes, the question of whether the
students were similarly situated did not even arise.
Female inmates, however, have received far different
treatment in the lower courts. For example, in Klinger v. Dep’t of
Corrections, the plaintiffs housed at Nebraska’s female institution stated for the purposes of litigation that they were similarly
situated to a male facility.61 The trial court agreed that the two
groups were similarly situated because they were both housed in
44

Nebraska correctional institutions, the institutions had a similar
range of custodial levels, and the purposes of incarceration were
the same for both groups.62 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed
the lower court’s decision by highlighting the differences between
the two institutions: the male facility housed six times as many
inmates as the women’s; the average stay at the men’s facility was
two to three times as long as at the women’s; the men’s facility
was two security grades higher than the women’s; and the women
had different characteristics from the men due to their parental status and likelihood of past abuse.63 Further, the appellate
court highlighted economic limitations: “[W]hen determining
programming at an individual prison under the restrictions of a
limited budget, prison officials must make hard choices.” 64 Thus,
the court was willing to allow inferior programming for women
based on “limited resources.” 65 The court seemed to conclude
that comparing male and female institutions is not just comparing apples and oranges, but comparing apples and Volkswagens.
The Eighth Circuit also granted substantial deference
to the prisons.66 The court concluded that doing any prison-toprison program comparison was “futile” and that doing such
a comparison “places the burden on prison officials to explain
decisions that resulted from the complicated interplay of many
variables.” 67 The court stated that any such asking of explanation would result in “micro-management” and worried that the
facilities would end up providing only the “bare constitutional
minimum of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal
protection liability.” 68 The aim of the litigation was to show that
the prison already was failing to provide the “bare constitutional
minimum.” Thus, in providing its worst-case scenario of the
prison sticking to the bare minimum, the court avoids forcing the
prisons to abide by the Constitution so as to avoid litigation.
In the murkiness of prison-based equal protection litigation, at least one court has made clear what “similarly situated”
does not mean: in Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corrections v. D.C., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
rejected a three-factor test that included similar custody levels,
sentence structures, and purposes of incarceration.69 Instead, the
court emphasized that there are “many considerations” and “innumerable variables,” including the characteristics of the inmates and
the size of the institution.70 This standard is extremely vague and
presents difficulties to future female prisoner litigants in choosing a similarly situated group to which to compare themselves.
Yet even after this rhetoric of innumerable variables, the court
focused on but one: the fact that the men’s prison had 936 inmates
and the women’s prison had only 167.71 The court concluded that
“it is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination” that
the smaller facility had fewer programs.72 This holding is disturbing because it in effect denies to women inmates any potential
success on equal protection grounds. Women compose a much
smaller percentage of the total inmate population.73 The smaller
number of female inmates allows most states to house all women
in the same, multi-classification prison, while men by virtue of
their greater population size can be broken into institutions by
individual classifications.74 Under the court’s holding, even if
the women were housed in separate institutions by classification,
they would not be similarly situated to the men due to population;
and if the women were housed together, they would not be similarly situated due to classification. The court fails to acknowledge
this reality.
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Other courts have also adhered to this belief that differThe court finishes with a parting lecture to the correcing sizes in population necessitates differing number and qual- tional authorities on the constitutional rights of inmates—a lecity of programs. In Keenan v. Smith, in which female inmates ture notably absent from the cases involving female inmates. The
brought an equal protection action based on denial of post- court begins with the lofty statement that “[t]he great object of
secondary education programs and prison industry employment, our Constitution is to preserve individual rights” and that “prison
the Eighth Circuit stated that “because
inmates are not completely stripped of
women account for such a small proportion
these rights as they step through the
of the total prison population, their facilities The logical extension of the prison gates.” 86 Further, the court chides
are necessarily smaller in size than any of court’s opinions is that women that a “prisoner may not be denied equal
the male-only prisons.” 75 It further admitted
treatment afforded those who share his
must wait until an equal
that due to the small size of the institution,
relevant characteristics, simply because
the most comparable in size of the male
number of women and men statistics show that he belongs to a group
institutions is an institution of the highest are incarcerated before they that typically does not bear those relevant
security classification.76 The Keenan court
characteristics.” 87 This is remarkable: in
can
ask
for
equal
services
concluded that two sets of dissimilarly situother words, a prisoner cannot be denied
ated inmates cannot be meaningfully comequal treatment afforded to others, “simand programs.
pared.77 At least in this case, Judge Heaney
ply” because statistics and data demonacknowledged the reality that under these
strate that he is not actually equal to the
standards, no group of female inmates could ever have standing others. No such allowance for numerical discrepancies was evifor an equal protection claim.78 His is a lone voice. The logical dent in the women’s cases. The gender discrimination evident in
extension of the court’s opinions is that women must wait until the courts’ opinions mars any chance that female inmates might
an equal number of women and men are incarcerated before they have to bring a successful equal protection suit.
can ask for equal services and programs.
Even if the inmates could prove that they were similarly
As a thought experiment, let us follow the courts’ logic situated, they would still have to show that the statute or reguto its conclusion. For women to establish themselves as similarly lation intentionally discriminated against them. In Canterino v.
situated to men, they must compare themselves by either (1) secu- Wilson, the Sixth Circuit found that the female inmates “failed
rity classification or (2) population. Female inmates have a low to prove that the denial of study and work release to members
chance of successful comparison under the first prong because of their class is gender-based discrimination on its face, because
while most of female prisons include prisoners of all classifica- both men and women are included in the class of people who
tions, the men’s prisons are often broken up into individual clas- may be denied study and work release.” 88 Under this standard,
sifications due to the number of inmates at each classification a claim based on the denial of programs could potentially fail
level.79 Thus, no such similarly situated group exists. Under the simply because not all male inmates received care.
second prong, if women were to use population size to establish
In some cases, gender segregation in prison may provide
a similarly situated group, they would be limited to the highest sufficient evidence of gender discrimination so that discriminasecurity men’s prisons. The highest security men’s prisons often tory intent need not be established. A Fourth Circuit opinion
house their inmates in solitary confinement for twenty-three found that “discriminatory intent need not be established indehours a day and therefore offer few, if any, programs.80 Fight- pendently when the classification is explicit.” 89 Prisons across
ing for these programs would not win the female inmates more the nation are segregated by gender and, although such segregaprogramming than they already have. For the female inmates, it tion has been found to be constitutional,90 the practice of sending
is a losing game.
women to one prison and men to another facially classifies on the
In shocking contrast, when men raise the equal protec- basis of gender.91 If the court finds that the resulting difference
tion issue, the courts take an entirely different view. Only a year in access to services imposes a burden on the female inmates,
before Keenan, a male inmate brought an equal protection claim discriminatory intent may not need to be established.
before the Eighth Circuit in Bills v. Dahm81 and received sigOverall, the courts have created an unworkable stannificantly different treatment. In Bills, the male inmate alleged dard, yet refuse to acknowledge that it effectively bars incarcerthat he was denied overnight visitation from his infant son while ated female litigants from recovery. Courts should not dismiss
female inmates were allowed such visitation.82 Instead of review- an Equal Protection case based on population differences, but
ing its laundry list of differences between a male Level 2 facil- should start from the premise that male and female inmates are
ity and a female Level 4 facility—the same levels of facilities similarly situated due to the equal dependence on the state to procontemplated in Klinger 83—the court stated that “[b]oth prisons vide mental health services and both have an equal right to care
hold a significant number of maximum security offenders.” 84 Pre- under the Constitution.
sumably, no drastic changes had occurred in the Nebraska correctional system, yet the court offered no analysis of the differing 2. United States v. Virginia: Separate
population sizes. Instead, the court concluded that “the make-up But Not Equal
of the inmate population at each of the prisons are not markedly
In United States v. Virginia, decided shortly after the
dissimilar,” yet allows, grudgingly, that it is “objectively reasonabove
cases,
the Supreme Court contemplated the Equal Protecable” for a prison official to have believed that the two groups
85
tion
Clause
in
regard to gender segregated institutions of higher
of inmates were not similarly situated. This is a quite a change
education,
coming
to a very different result. The Virginia Milfrom the previous opinions that found an insurmountable differitary
Institute
(“VMI”)
historically accepted only men into its
ence between male and female prisons.
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academy.92 VMI enrolled about 1,300 male cadets each year.93
In response to litigation contesting its refusal of female candidates, VMI proposed a separate, parallel program for women:
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (“VMIL”), which had
an expected first-year class of twenty-five women.94 While the
institutions would share the same mission, “the VWIL program
would differ from VMI in academic offerings, methods of education, and financial resources,” 95 largely based on the perceived
differences and needs of a female population.96 The different
population sizes and program options are analogous to those in
male and female prisons, yet here the Court ruled in favor of
the female plaintiffs, finding that VWIL was not an appropriately
parallel program and that VMI must admit female cadets. A court
has even more reason to make a similar ruling in favor of female
inmates; students have the option of choosing whether to attend
an inferior school whereas female inmates have no choice.
Justice Ginsburg began her opinion in Virginia with the
core instruction of equal protection analysis: “Parties who seek
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
exceedingly persuasive justification for that action.” 97 The court
“has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they
are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their
individual talents and capacities.” 98 Any justification of such a
policy must demonstrate “important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.” 99 Sex-based classifications may not be used “to create or perpetuate the legal, social,
and economic inferiority of women.”100 In Flynn’s case, the gender differences in availability of treatment result in distinct disadvantages to female inmates: they receive inferior mental health
services, which will affect their ability to participate in vocational training and other programming integral to post-release
success. When the prison denies them equal services, they are
maintained in an inferior position relative to the men who receive
the services, a disadvantage that affects the women even postincarceration.
In examining VMI’s justification for the male-only classification, the court stated that a justification “must describe
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact
differently grounded.”101 The court rejected Virginia’s claim
that VMI furthered diversity in educational institution choices;
although single-sex institutions may in fact promote diversity,
Virginia’s public institution history provided no evidence that
VMI’s single-sex admission policy was intended to further this
purpose.102 Applying this analysis to Flynn’s case, the primary
reason for gender-segregation in prison appears to be population management or security. Neither reason, however, bears any
rational relation to the differing quality of mental health treatment between the male and female institutions.
Differences in institutional populations did not keep the
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia from finding similarly
situated groups. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
justified its holding denying programs to the smaller female correctional institutions by stating that parents of students at Smith
College, an all-female institution, would not raise an eyebrow to
discover that Harvard University, many times Smith’s size, offers
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considerably more classes.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court did
not even discuss in Virginia the 1,300 student enrollment of VMI
in comparison with the twenty-five student enrollment of VWIL.
In addition, inmates have an even stronger claim for
medical and mental health services than for educational programming.104 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
stated that “an inmate has no constitutional right to work and
educational opportunities.”105 Yet under an Eighth Amendment
analysis in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court declared that
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.106 If the Supreme
Court was dissatisfied with a facility that planned to enroll a mere
twenty-five female students a year, surely the federal courts can
do better for the 112,498 women in prison who are denied not
just educational opportunities, but health care to which they have
a constitutional right.
The second prong of the Virginia analysis focused on
the proposed remedial measures to be taken by Virginia to remedy the equal protection violation. Any remedy must “closely
fit the constitutional violation [and] must be shaped to place
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of
discrimination.”107 In the context of prisons, the mental health
resources currently available to men—such as separate facilities
solely for the treatment of mentally-ill inmates and additional
health staff and programs—must be made equally available to
female inmates.
Overall, the federal circuit courts have largely dismissed
female inmates’ suits based on a flawed notion of what constitutes a “similarly situated” party. In contrast, the Supreme Court
has always treated the similarly situated analysis as inclusive of
groups with some differences and has applied it to higher education institutions much more leniently than the appellate courts
have to the female inmate litigants.

B. The ‘Important Governmental Objective’
of Parsimony
The primary justification for a prison’s discriminatory
policies often comes down to economics. If gender discrimination is established, it may still survive heightened scrutiny if the
correctional authorities can establish important governmental
objectives that are accomplished through this discrimination.108
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has already
declared that, even allowing that a burden has been imposed on
female inmates due to gender discrimination, limited financial
resources are enough reason to justify the prison’s discrimination.109 The Eighth Circuit has also found that any analysis of
gender discrimination in female inmates’ programming must
make allowances for the prison’s limited resources and economic
constraints.110 Even in Bowring v. Godwin, a case that extended
an inmate’s constitutional right to medical care to also include
mental health care,111 the Fourth Circuit stated:
The right to treatment is, of course, limited to
that which may be provided upon a reasonable
cost and time basis and the essential test is one
of medical necessity and not simply that which
may be considered merely desirable.112
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No one would argue that gender or racial discrimination
could exist in greater society based on financial considerations;
consider the obvious costs of providing equal pay for equal work.
The courts’ argument that a constitutional right can be limited
by cost therefore seems inherently wrong and solely based on
the prisoners’ incarcerated status.113 Thus, even when the female
inmates have a winning hand in proving discrimination, they may
still fail because the house is bankrupt.

III. Conclusion
Flynn should use United States v. Virginia to argue that
differing populations and genders cannot be a basis for discrimination in correctional facilities. The broader, national concern,

however, is with the attitude of the courts toward inmates, and the
allowances made for discrimination based on imprisonment status. Tellingly, none of the Equal Protection cases found in favor
of the inmates. The courts have erected serious obstacles to a successful claim by creating an unworkable standard for “similarly
situated” prison groups and allowing finances to limit constitutional rights. Inadequate services for mentally-ill female inmates
harm not just the women, but also the poor, urban communities to
which many of these women return. Without mental health care,
the women are at a greater risk of recidivism. The bottom line
is that female inmates have a constitutional right to medical and
mental health care and a right to equal treatment to that received
by the male inmates, which is not currently being provided in
America’s prisons.
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Commentary on Proposition 8: Much Ado About Nothing
or A Wake Up Call to Do Something
By
Lydia Edwards, Esq.*
On November 4, 2008, California voters passed Prop- possibility of marriage for a targeted group and is, therefore, a
osition 8 (“Prop 8”), amending the California Constitution to violation of the civil rights of all Californians. They argued that
declare, “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid because the California Supreme Court declared marriage a funor recognized in California.”1 On that same night Barack Obama damental right, Prop 8 is a violation of state equal protection.
was elected the first African-American PresiFinally, they argued that domestic partdent of the United States. The concurrence of
nerships and civil unions are not compathese two events spurred emotionally charged Final analysis shows that the rable to marriage because the doctrine of
accusations from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisex“separate but equal” is unconstitutional.
voting patterns of
ual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) community
election night, the Los AngeAfrican-Americans mirrored les TimesOn(“L.A.
towards the African-American community.
Times”) reported that
those of other groups and Proposition 8 passed with 52.2% of the
Also telling about the night of November 4,
2008 was the discourse about who was a vicbroke down generationally. vote.9 On November 5, 2008, the L.A.
tim and who was perpetrator of Prop 8. Much
Times, along with several major newsof the media reports and immediate reaction
papers, cited an AP exit poll showing
created a dichotomy of straight African-Americans discriminat- that 70% of African-American voters supported Proposition 8.10
Along with religious organizations such as the Mormon Church,
ing against white gays and lesbians.
African-Americans were seen as one of the key components to
the measure’s passage.11
Background
Reactions to the news that African-American voters
had overwhelmingly supported Prop 8 were swift and emotional;
In March 2000, California voters passed Proposition eliciting pain, frustration, shock, and in some cases bigotry. Dan
22, declaring that only marriage between a man and a woman Savage, a gay columnist and civil rights activist, can summarize
would be valid or recognized in California. On May 15, 2008, the the frustration of many gay activists in this November 5 post:12
California Supreme Court ruled in a 4–3 decision that the statute
I’m done pretending that the handful of racist
enacted by Proposition 22, and other similar statutes limiting the
gay white men out there—and they’re out there,
definition of marriage, violated the equal protection clause of the
and I think they’re scum—are a bigger probCalifornia Constitution.2 The Court ultimately found that indilem for African Americans, gay and straight,
viduals of the same sex have the right to marry under the Calithan the huge numbers of homophobic African
fornia Constitution and that same-sex marriage should therefore
Americans are for gay Americans, whatever
be valid and recognized in California.3 In reaction to the Court’s
their color.13
decision, opponents to same-sex marriage put forward Proposition 8 to add the language of Proposition 22 to the California
Blogs and news broadcasts throughout the country disConstitution.
cussed
the
passage of Prop 8 in a dichotomous tone with AfricanThe campaign to pass Proposition 8 was largely led by
Americans
on one side and gay men and lesbians on the other. As
two organizations: “Protect Marriage” and “Yes on Proposition
seen
in
this
comment from Jeff Jacoby, a white columnist for the
8.” Their arguments for the passage of Proposition 8 were threeBoston
Globe:
4
fold. First, they argued that Prop 8 restored the definition of
marriage to the same language Californians voted for in 2000.5
If black voters overwhelmingly reject the claim
Second, they stated that Prop 8 overturned the decision of the four
that marriage amendments like Proposition 8
California Supreme Court judges who acted undemocratically to
are nothing more than bigotry-fueled assaults
ignore the will of the people and legislated from the bench to
on civil rights, perhaps it is because they know
declare Prop 22 unconstitutional.6 Finally, the two proponents
only too well what real bigotry looks like. Perargued that Prop 8 protects children from being taught in public
haps it is because they resent the assertion that
schools that marriage between members of the same sex is the
adhering to the ageless meaning of marriage is
same as “traditional” heterosexual marriage.7 They argued that
tantamount to supporting the pervasive humiliProp 8 would “prevent other consequences to Californians who
ation and cruelty of Jim Crow.14
will be forced to not just be tolerant of gay lifestyles, but face
mandatory compliance regardless of their personal beliefs.” 8
Yet another example,
The campaign to defeat Proposition 8 was lead by “No
White gay media like to presume they are
on Prop 8, Equality for All.” This group argued that by defining
absolved from racism because they are steady
marriage as between a man and a woman, Prop 8 eliminated the
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lack of African-American gay and lesbian leaders. Those civil
rights activists and trailblazers who were gay were encouraged
or required to stay in the closet and prioritize the struggle for
race or gender equality. As scholars have noted, for many in the
African-American community, homosexuality is not “black.”19
Identification as gay or lesbian for many is viewed as representative of European society; being out as an African-American may
be seen as race-negating.20 Far too often, homosexuality is considered comical, disgusting, or a form of betrayal. Books like On
As the fervor of election night died off, people went the Down Low,21 by J. L. King, continue to perpetuate the notion
back to examine the actual statistics from the exit polls. Fur- that homosexuality is a home-wrecking, AIDS-spreading virus
ther analysis of the population of African-Americans in the state that steals African-American men from their families. These steof California—6.2%—demonstrates that if 70% of African- reotypes result in homosexual people of color being perceived as
Americans did vote for the passage of Prop 8, it would still be less black, encouraging a form of in-group passing.22
highly unlikely that they alone would account for the initiative’s
The role of religion should not be ignored for its contripassage.16 Later polls threw suspicion onto the high numbers bution to the ostracism of gay men and lesbians of all colors from
recorded at the exit polls. Final analysis shows that the voting the African-American community. Religious leaders in large
patterns of African-Americans mirrored those of other groups churches often preach about homosexuality as one of the worst
and broke down generationally.17
sins against God.23 This rhetoric spreads from the same pulpits
that inspired the non-violent Civil Rights Movement. Donny
McClerkin,24 for example, is a very popular gospel singer and a
self-proclaimed “ex-gay,” who has described homosexuality as “a
How Blacks Became Straight and
curse against which he must do battle.” 25
Gays Became White
Bayard Rustin is an evocative example of how an AfriPeople could debate for an eternity as to why voters in can-American man is lauded for his commitment to civil rights,
California decided to overturn their state supreme court and void but encouraged to quiet his sexuality.26 Rustin was one of the
thousands of marriages, but that is not this article’s focus. Instead, primary organizers of the 1963 March on Washington but was
we propose that the passage of Proposition 8
kept out of public roles in the Civil Rights
and the subsequent media description of the
Movement and forced to downplay his
issue as “black v. gay” was a call to action;
sexuality. Rustin was a leading advisor and
“We’re literally killing
a call to truly analyze the way the United
speech writer for Dr. Martin Luther King,27
ourselves
over
this
fear
of
States discusses sexuality and race and to
helped to integrate non-violent direct action
homosexuality.”
point out that people in both the LGBT and
into the Civil Rights Movement, and was a
African-American communities are in part
powerbroker for organized labor, the Amerto blame for the “black v. gay” dichotomy.
ican Democratic Party, and world affairs.28
This falsehood, based on stereotypes of African-Americans as “Few African-Americans engaged in as broad a protest agenda as
wholly heterosexual and the LGBT community as mainly white did Rustin; even fewer enjoyed his breadth of influence in virtuand upper-middle class, has injured both movements’ quest for ally every political sector of American life. Nevertheless, Rustin
equality and silenced the voices of many LGBT people of color. remained the quintessential outsider in black civil rights circles
As Wanda Sykes states in The Advocate, “We’re literally killing for much of his life due to his ‘deviant’ sexual identity.” 29
ourselves over this fear of homosexuality.”18 To provide any guidPauli Murray is another example of an African-American
ance for better discourse it is necessary to understand how the committed to causes of gender and racial equality, but conflicted
discourse created the dichotomy that many observe today.
about her sexuality, which she kept hidden from many people.30
African-Americans have suffered extreme and often vio- Murray was the co-founder of NOW (National Organization of
lent discrimination from the beginning of American history. One Women),31 and the first black attorney to publish in an academic
might expect a greater sense of empathy on the part of African- law review. Among many writings on civil rights, Murray drafted
Americans for the struggle for gay rights, and indeed much of the the States’ Laws on Race and Color, which Thurgood Marshall
initial surprise and hurt over the reported disproportionate per- called the “Bible for civil rights lawyers.”32 She is also credited
centage of African-American vote for Proposition 8 arose from a with coming up with the Fourteenth Amendment legal theobelief that there should have been a greater sense of empathy.
ries used by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the 1970s.33 Least known,
The relationship between African-Americans and the but one of her greatest contributions to the African-American
LGBT community is hard to characterize. Religion, family, community and American legal thought, was her conviction to
experience, and education influence each person within a com- attack the essence of the long held legal theory of “separate but
munity. If one is going to generalize, however, that homophobia equal.”34 Yet, Murray never declared herself a lesbian. Between
is prevalent in many black communities, this may stem in part fighting for gender inclusion in the Civil Rights Movement and
from the lack of visibility of African-American LGBT people racial understanding in the Women’s Rights Movement, Murray
as leaders or prominent members of the community. That is not may have felt overwhelmed.
to say African-Americans are not as open about their sexualThe African-American community’s reluctance to celity as White Americans—it is more a critique of the historical ebrate diversity among its leaders and heroes helps to perpetuate
riding on the backs of the civil rights movement
as if the victimization is of the same creed. As
a black gay woman this is a conundrum that I
live with daily, but in the end I agree with the
larger black populace that is often resentful of
how white gay America has hijacked the civil
rights movement without any effort to create
coalitions.15
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a heterosexual normalcy of the African-American experience. deeply splintered over the relevance of racism to the fight against
This refusal also allows negative stereotypes about gay men homophobia.” 40 For others it seems to trivialize the experience
and lesbians to pervade unchecked. It is of no surprise, there- of people of color in the United States. For still others, there is
fore, that the headlines following the passage of Proposition 8 a sense of disgust and abhorrence for any likening of Africantalked about the African-American community as though it were Americans to gays and lesbians. As explained by Colin Powell,
wholly heterosexual. As Marlon T. Riggs
“homosexuality is not a benign . . . characstated in Tongues Untied : “In the great gay
teristic such as skin color . . . . It goes to one
mecca, I was an invisible man, still I had no
of the most fundamental aspects of human
shadow, no substance, no history, no place, Gay and lesbian Americans behavior.” 41
of all colors have suffered
no reflection.”35
Like most civil rights movements,
LGBT legal analysis evolves from discrimination and ostracism the LGBT movement uses the faces of averparallel arguments advanced in gay and
age Americans to engender empathy. The
lesbian political activism.36 Gay and les- from “mainstream” American face of the LBGT movement has been overideals and legal equality.
bian Americans of all colors have suffered
whelmingly portrayed as white and middle
discrimination and ostracism from “mainclass. As Devon W. Carbado explains, the
stream” American ideals and legal equalmovement seems to use “but for” gay peoity. Still, conversations about racial inequality are largely absent ple.42 These are people “who, but for their sexual orientation,
from LGBT discourse unless when comparing gay and lesbian [are] perfectly mainstream.” 43 The use of the “but for” gay peoquest for equality with that of African-Americans. This compari- ple seems like a missed opportunity to be inclusive and obscures
son and discourse contribute to the “black v. gay” dichotomy. history.
Along with other factors, this comparison has helped to create a
“white-washed” portrayal of the incredibly diverse LGBT comPerry Watkins: A Case Study
munity and the false dichotomy following the passage of Propoin White-Washing
sition 8.
This “white-washing” may be a result of conscious
A perfect example of the failure of the LGBT moveefforts in some of the LGBT leadership to ignore issues of race
ment to be racially inclusive is the case of Sergeant Perry Watand gender. Richard Mohr, noted gay rights activist, urged gay
kins. Watkins was nineteen years old when he was drafted into
organizations not to build coalitions with other groups, including
the military.44 At the time he was drafted he acknowledged he
African-Americans and women, because it was a wasteful drain
was gay. Watkins again acknowledged his homosexuality in an
on the movement.37 Others feel, in some respects, gays and lesaffidavit after being subject to a criminal investigation. Watkins
bians are more discriminated against than African-Americans.
explained, “he had been a homosexual from the age of thirteen
Andrew Sullivan, gay conservative columnist, explained such
and that, since his enlistment, he had engaged in sodomy with
when comparing slavery for heterosexual African-Americans and
two other servicemen.” The army ended the investigation due to
white gays and lesbians.
“insufficient evidence.” 45
Watkins performed in drag at official and unofficial
But even slaves, if they were heterosexual,
military
gatherings
that were heavily attended.46 So it came as a
were occasionally allowed the right to marry
surprise when in 1982, Watkins was separated from the Army for
the person they loved. That right was often
being a homosexual. In all Watkins served 14 years in the Army
peremptorily taken away, but when it was, the
and became in the words of his commanding officer, “one of our
hideousness of the injustice was clear. But that
most respected and trusted soldiers.” 47 Watkins fought back to be
injustice is unavailable to homosexuals, because
reinstated in the Army and he won. To this day, Watkins is the first
they haven’t even been deemed eligible for the
openly gay serviceman to successfully challenge the military’s
institution of marriage in the first place; they
antigay policy.
have been, from one particular perspective,
38
Despite Watkins’ significant civil rights milestone for
beneath slave. And they still are.
the LGBT movement, he is virtually unknown. Instead of using
Many people believe the prioritization of marriage Watkins as the face of the fight against the military ban on gay
equality for the LGBT movement is a result of the lack of diver- men and lesbians, the LGBT leadership chose to focus their camsity in LGBT leadership and the failure to listen to gay men and paigns on white soldiers such as Keith Meinhold, Joseph Steffan
lesbians of color. As Paula Ettelbrick explains: “[T]hose closer and Margarethe Cammermeyer. Commenting on how the LGBT
to the norm or to power in the country are more likely to see community promoted Cammermeyer, Watkins remarked “we’ll
marriage as a principle of freedom and equality. Those who are go with a [white] woman who lied for twenty years before we go
acceptable to the mainstream because of race, gender and eco- with a black man who had to live the struggle nearly every day
nomic status are more likely to want the right to marry. It is the of his life.” 48
final acceptance, the ultimate affirmation of identity.”39
For Watkins’ case, along with the cases of many others,
The LGBT movement historically and presently seems race helps explain the lack of attention gay rights proponents paid
to have prioritized becoming part of the American “mainstream.” to him and to his story.49 Tom Stoddard, the lawyer who directed
People of color often meet comparison arguments, such as the Campaign for Military Service, commented that there was a
Andrew Sullivan’s above, with disdain. For many, the “use of public relations problem with Watkins because he wore a nose
racial analogies is suspect, coming as it does from a movement ring and had a counter culture image, not because Watkins was
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black.50 This seems unlikely considering the PR problem with 8. We suggest to both groups to make conscious efforts to supWatkins could have been solved by taking out his nose ring and port one another in their common goal. We also suggest that each
group individually assess its message and
putting him in a suit. More likely than not,
visible representation to ensure an inclusive
Watkins’ case was more complicated than
the “but for” gays the movement chose
. . . “we’ll go with a [white] discourse.A common expression of discrimito promote.51 Watkins’ story would have
woman who lied for twenty nation faced by the African-American and
required a discussion of race, complicating
the LGBT movement’s strategy for fighting
years before we go with a LGBT community alike is police brutality.
would be a positive step to see and hear
the military ban.52
black man who had to live Itfrom
more LGBT organizations on issues
When Watkins died of AIDS at the
the struggle nearly every
of police violence and racial profiling of
age of 47, he still felt a sense of betrayal
people of color. In addition, organizations
by the national gay leaders who chose to
day of his life.”
that deal with race relations with the police
promote white soldiers over himself. “It’s
should dedicate some of their message to
blatant racism,” said Watkins, when the
same LGBT activists disinvited him from testifying at 1993 the harassment that gay men and lesbians face.
We suggest that organizations dedicated to racial equalCongressional hearings on the ban, even though he was the only
openly gay service person to go to the top of the court system and ity make sure to be consistent in their message for equality for
all Americans and support the LGBT community in its fight for
emerge victorious.53
equality. More importantly, we suggest that these organizations
diversify their leadership and ensure that their leaders and role
models are no less celebrated because they are gay or lesbian.
So Where Do We Go From Here
Similarly, gay and lesbian organizations need to diversify their
An attempt to solve this discourse dilemma in one arti- leadership to include more people of color. When presenting
cle is impossible. However, by continuing the conversation about the face of the LGBT movement to engender empathy, LGBT
how we talk about race and sexuality in the United States, we organizations should make a conscious effort to include racial
hope to answer the call to action prompted by the passage of Prop diversity.
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Movie Review: Vincent Who?
Directed by
Tony Lam and Produced by Curtis Chin, 2008
By Yeon Me Kim

On June 19, 1982, two white autoworkers killed Vincent
Chin, a Chinese-American man whom they mistook as Japanese
at the peak of anti-Japanese sentiments in Detroit. The American
auto industry was going through a severe recession; Japan, its
competitor, was blamed for the countless layoffs of U.S. autoworkers as Japan’s auto industry was growing while the American auto industry was in a severe recession. Vincent Chin was
brutally bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat during a night
out when he was celebrating his bachelor’s party. Because of
this hate crime, Vincent’s life ended at the young age of twentyseven.
Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz, Vincent’s murderers,
pled guilty to manslaughter and were sentenced to three years of
probation and a $3,720 fine. Judge Kaufman said that imprisoning a man who has committed to the same company for 17–18
years would not do any good for the society. This lenient ruling
outraged Asian-Americans and galvanized them to organize a
protest movement. Lisa Chan, an attorney, initiated “The American Citizens for Justice,” to help publicize the incident. Publication led to rallies and public outrage eventually became the drive
for the 1984 federal civil rights case against the defendants. The
jury gave Ebens a twenty-five year sentence and found him guilty
of violating Vincent’s civil rights under 18 U.S.C. Section 245(b)
(2)(F). Nitz was acquitted of all charges. Eben’s case was overturned on appeal, however, because the trial court had refused
to admit certain evidence. On retrial in Cincinnati, Ohio, a jury
acquitted Ebens of all charges.
The documentary “Vincent Who?” directed by Tony
Lam and produced by Curtis Chin, examines how Vincent Chin’s
case has influenced the Asian-American community especially
with regards to the recognition of their civil rights. The documentary focuses on a national town hall meeting memorializing
the 25th anniversary of Chin’s death. “Vincent Who” includes
interviews of Asian-Americans involved in the case and AsianAmerican civil rights activists sharing their stories and reflections. The documentary suggests that the pan-Asian-American
movement emerged after the murder. The biased court ruling for
the defendants became a watershed event for Asian-Americans to
recognize the need to call for protection of their civil rights.
The Asian-American community was outraged by
Chin’s murder. Not only was he killed because of his outward
appearance, but the defendants’ sentences for his murder were
unfairly lenient. One of the interviewees, Ms. Nhung Truong, a
District Representative for California Congressman Adam Schiff,
described her outrage when she heard the story for the first time.
A person selling “V. Chin” t-shirts at a local festival told her
about the murder. The case changed her life and motivated her
into politics and community activism. She became an agent for
preventing the abuse of Asian-Americans’ civil rights by seeking to raise the Asian-American voice in the American political
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system. Ms. Troung expressed that Chin would have been alive if
he were not Asian-American. She said that the ruling for Chin’s
murderers would not have come out so unfairly if he were not
Asian-American.
The outrage of Asian-American community forced them
to come together and fight for their rights. The documentary suggests that the murder brought the Asian-American community
together. The stark injustice perhaps tapped into a grudge subconsciously harbored for feeling as outsiders in the American society. The interviewees in “Vincent Who?” were amazed at how the
murder fired up a local Asian-American movement that eventually
sparked a national pan-Asian-American civil rights movement.
Dale Minami, a civil rights attorney featured in the
documentary, explained that the race issue in the U.S. is always
framed as a dichotomy between black and white. “Asian-American” is not part of the discussion of civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is partly because the immigration
history of Asian-Americans is short, especially compared to that
of African-Americans. Minami theorizes that, unlike AfricanAmericans, Asian-Americans are still influenced by the culture
of their country of origin. Often, people regard Asian-Americans’
lingering ties to their country of origin as being disloyal to the
U.S. This view may lead people, like Chin’s murders, to view
Asian-Americans with suspicion. The autoworkers expressed
their anger against the Japanese auto industry toward Chin, who
they assumed was a Japanese-American.
This documentary suggests that the pan-Asian-American civil rights movement rejects the view that Asian-Americans
are necessarily tied to their country of origin. They also reject the
view that these ties reinforce the gap between Asian-Americans
and the majority of U.S. society. Although some Asian-Americans have cultural ties to their country of origin, this is not unique
within U.S. society.1 The U.S. has traditionally been a melting
pot of immigrants, who have always brought new cultures to this
country.2 Yet, these cultures have been assimilated into the mainstream. Relative to other immigrant groups, Asian-Americans
are late arrivals to U.S. society.3 They are now going through the
transition of full-fledged integration into society, as other immigrants did in the past.4 Thus, they should not be discouraged
from melting into the U.S. mainstream.5 Once Asian-Americans
become citizens, they should be treated equally in every aspect;
origin or culture should not be grounds for discrimination.
“Vincent Who?” describes an important historical landmark served by Vincent Chin, an unintended martyr. The discrimination against Asian-Americans during the Chin trials inspired
the pan-Asian-American civil right movement which continues
to address the problems of discrimination. Through the efforts of
this movement, realization of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protections Clause rights will become whole by rendering equal
rights to every American citizen.
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National South Asian Summit
Founder’s Celebration
April 24th – 26th, 2009
The 2009 South Asian Summit is hosted by the South Asian Law Students Association
at the American University Washington College of Law & South Asian Americans
Leading Together (SAALT).
The Summit provides an opportunity for South Asian organizational leaders, community
members, and students to engage with policymakers in DC; to learn about issues of concern;
and to strategize around best practices and future collaborations.
This will be a great opportunity to meet lawyers, advocates, students, professionals, service
providers, and non-profit staff members from around the country.
The event is FREE for WCL Students, Faculty, Staff, Alumni, and Affiliates.

A Quick Look at the Agenda
w Friday, April 24th/10AM–4PM:

 riefing to and from Congress, meetings with Congressional members,
B
briefings with Administration officials, and DC site visits

w Friday, April 24th/7PM–9PM:

ChangeMaker Awards Reception (K&L Gates – 1601 K St. NW)

w Saturday, April 25th/9AM–8PM: 	Discussions and workshops on issues affecting the South Asian community
as well as skills-building trainings (American University, Washington College
of Law), followed by a reception (6:30–8PM)

w Sunday, April 26th/9AM–12:00PM: Regional Breakouts, Open Space, Closing Session (American University,
Washington College of Law)

www.wcl.american.edu/secle
For more information: visit www.saalt.org or email summit09@saalt.org
Register using this link:
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By Guadalupe A. Lopez

H.R. 11: Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was signed into law on
January 29, 2009. It was passed by a House vote of 250–177
and was promptly signed by President Obama, becoming Public
Law No. 111-2. The Act amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 which prohibits discrimination in compensation on the
basis of color, religion, sex or national origin. The Act provides
that unlawful employment practice occurs when 1) a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, 2) an
individual becomes subject to the decision or practice, or 3) an
individual is affected by the application of the decision or practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation
is paid.1 The Act effectively overrules the Supreme Court’s holding in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. In Ledbetter, in
a 5–4 decision, the Court held that under Title VII, an employee
may only seek redress against pay discrimination within 180 days
of the alleged discriminatory act.2 This meant that an employee
could not bring an otherwise valid pay discrimination claim
against an employer if he or she did not discover the initial discriminatory act within 180 days. The Court’s decision failed to
address that often times employees will not learn that they have
been victims of discrimination until after 180 days from the time
when the employer decides to take such action. Under the Court’s
ruling, an employee was left without recourse; the employer was
then free to continue discriminating.
In her EEOC claim, Lilly Ledbetter argued that the 180-day
statue of limitations should be renewed each time an employer
issues an intentionally discriminatory wage or salary paycheck.3
Congress agreed with Mrs. Ledbetter, recognizing that the Court’s
decision “unduly restricted the time period in which victims of
discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent
of Congress.” 4 Proponents of the Act maintain that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation in the Ledbetter decision was unrealistic
and unfair. The Court’s interpretation ignored the real-world facts
of discrimination and harmed thousands of women.5 Critics of
the Act argue that it will encourage needless decades-old litigation against employers who may not have had committed the initial discriminatory act.6 However, the Act limits the amount of
recovered back pay to those withheld within the two years preceding the filing of the complaint. This limitation discourages
employees from delaying to bring their claims. The Act similarly
amends provisions on the Age Discrimination Employment Act
of 1967 and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990.7

H.R. 2: Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2009
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, or SCHIP, was signed on January 14, 2009. It
became Public Law 111-3 after passing the House with a vote
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of 290–135. The Act will allow 7 million children to continue
receiving health insurance while extending this same coverage
to an additional 4.1 million uninsured children. The SCHIP will
assist children in low-income households which earn too much to
qualify for Medicaid but are still unable to afford health insurance.
The Act will extend Medicaid eligibility by changing the
eligibility rules including documentation of citizenship. Rather
than requiring documentation of citizenship, the Act gives States
the option to verify an applicant’s citizenship through their Social
Security number. This will allow an applicant to obtain coverage
while being in the process of securing citizenship documentation.8 The Act will also provide States with the option to assist
legal immigrant children and pregnant women without the 5-year
legal residence restriction.
The Bush Administration firmly opposed this legislation
when it was first introduced in 2007, vetoing it on two separate occasions.9 Like the Bush Administration, critics of the Act
argue that it will provide needless health insurance to an estimated 2.4 million children who would otherwise be covered by
private health insurance.10 Sponsors of the Bill refute this claim
by pointing to the estimated 4 million jobs which have reportedly
been lost within the past year. The children within those households, in the end, will no longer receive private health insurance.11
The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of expanding coverage under the Act to average around $32.8 billion from
2009–2013.12 Funding for the program will be provided through
a 62-cent increase on cigarette tax which will raise the price of
cigarettes $1.01 a pack. It will also require an increase in tax for
other tobacco products.13

H.R. 1064: “The Youth Prison Reduction
through Opportunities, Mentoring,
Intervention, Support, and Education Act”
The Youth Promise Act seeks to provide alternatives to prosecution and incarceration which have proven to be more effective
in reducing crime and violence in young offenders.14 The Act is
a bipartisan effort which acknowledges that excessively punitive
juvenile justice policies increase long-term crime risks. Instead,
the Youth Promises Act is aimed at intervention and preventive
measures targeting at-risk youths as well as their families. It proposes providing local communities with the resources necessary
to develop all-inclusive plans designed primarily by representatives from local faith organizations, law enforcement, schools,
community organizations, and health and social service providers.15 The objective behind these community-based programs is to
develop crime prevention, research, and intervention services for
gang members and at-risk youths. This evidence-based approach
to juvenile delinquency will furnish grants for the research of
adolescent development through methods responsive to the needs
and strengths of individual communities, focusing on cultural
and linguistic differences.
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Proponents of the Act claim that this preventive approach
will yield a greater decrease of recidivism of juvenile delinquents. Furthermore, this approach will be less costly than punishment-oriented approaches such as the Gang Abatement and
Prevention Act. That Act seeks to deter criminal gang activity
by imposing stricter criminal penalties on juvenile offenders.16
Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”),
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and Human Rights Watch have applauded the Youth Promises
Act after noting that incarcerated offenders disproportionately
belong to low income and minority communities.17 The ACLU
has acknowledged that the Bill is a step towards “breaking the
vicious ‘school-to-prison pileline’ wherein children, overwhelmingly children of color, in elementary, middle and high schools
are pushed out of the classroom and into the juvenile and eventually adult criminal justice system.”18 The Bill was introduced by
Robert C. Scott (D-VA) and Mike Castle (R-DE) with 69 original
co-sponsors in the House of Representatives. An identical bill
was introduced in the Senate, S. 435, by Rover Casey (D-PA) and
Olympia Snow (R-ME).

H.R. 738: “Deaths in Custody Reporting
Act of 2009”
The Act requires States to report to the Attorney General
information regarding the death of any person who is detained,
under arrest, or being arrested, in a State-run prison or Staterun detention center (including immigration and juvenile detention facilities).19 Among the information required by the Act

are 1) a description of the person, 2) the date, time and location of the death, 3) the law enforcement agency under which the
death occurred, and 4) a brief description of the circumstances
surrounding the death.20 The Act addresses certain deficiencies
within the “Deaths in Custody Reporting Act of 2000.” The 2000
Act, for instance, required only reporting from State-run and not
federal detention facilities. It directed States to make only an
initial report to the Attorney General concerning the death of a
detainee. The proposed 2009 Act, in addition to this initial report,
directs the Attorney General to conduct a study to “examine the
relationship, if any, between the number of such deaths and the
actions of management of such jails, prisons, and other specified
facilities.” 21 Such a requirement will reject vague descriptions
such as “unresponsive” or “undetermined” as reasons behind a
person’s death.22 Proponents of the Act assert it will ensure transparency and accountability by requiring proper documentation
and inquiry into a person’s death while in government hands.23
The Act comes at a time of mounting concern over the questionable deaths and alleged neglect occurring within federal-run
immigrant detention facilities.24 Reports of the reprehensible
treatment of immigrant detainees have resulted in increasing support for this Act by groups such as the ACLU.25
Compliance with the Act shall be enforced through eligibility for federal funding. The Bureau of Justice as well as facilities
currently receiving federal government funding will lose 10% of
such funding if they fail to provide details regarding the death of
a detainee in a timely manner.26 States in compliance with the
program would receive this funding. The bill, introduced by Representative Robert Scott (D-VA), has been referred to the Senate
Committee after passing through the House with a 407–1 vote.
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Announcing
Progressive People of Color Caucus
n Progressive People of Color Caucus is a new initiative founded by students of color interested in creating a supportive space for color-and-politics consciousness at WCL.
n We invite any WCL community member who self-identifies as a person of color and who
is passionate about the politics of race and ethnicity to join PPOCC.
n We intend to sponsor several informal and formal conversations about our guiding principles and future activities through semester’s end.
n As a self-governed group that depends on individual contributions rather than a chain of
command we’ll need your involvement and input to sustain our vision.

To join our listserve, please contact

ppocc.wcl@gmail.com

